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Abstract
We consider principal-agent contracting models between a seller and a buyer with single-
dimensional private information. The buyer’s type follows a continuous distribution on a
bounded interval. We present a new modelling approach where the seller offers a menu of
finitely many contracts to the buyer. The approach distinguishes itself from existing methods
by pooling the buyer types using a partition. That is, the seller first chooses the number of
contracts offered and then partitions the set of buyer types into subintervals. All types in a
subinterval are pooled and offered the same contract by the design of our menu.
We call this approach robust pooling and apply it to utility maximisation and cost min-
imisation problems. In particular, we analyse two concrete problems from the literature. For
both problems we are able to express structural results as a function of a single new parameter,
which remarkably does not depend on all instance parameters. We determine the optimal par-
tition and the corresponding optimal menu of contracts. This results in new insights into the
(sub)optimality of the equidistant partition. For example, the equidistant partition is optimal
for a family of instances for one of the problems. Finally, we derive performance guarantees
for the equidistant and optimal partitions for a given number of contracts. For the considered
problems the robust pooling approach has good performances with only a few contracts.
Keywords: mechanism design, asymmetric information, robust pooling, optimal partitioning,
performance guarantees
1
Econometric Institute Report EI2017-10
1 Introduction
In principal-agent contracting problems, a principal wants to persuade an agent to perform a certain
action and uses financial incentives to do so. Both parties are individually rational and only want
to improve their own situation. We consider contracting problems where the principal is a seller of
a certain product and the agent is a potential buyer. Thus, the seller desires either to initiate new
trade with the buyer or to change the existing buyer’s order quantity to a more beneficial order. In
order to do so, the seller offers a contract to the buyer, describing the order quantity (the action)
and a side payment (the incentive). The contract design must balance the value of the contract for
both parties, since the buyer can refuse a disadvantageous contract.
The complexity of the contracting problem increases significantly when the buyer has private
information on his valuation of contracts, i.e., there is information asymmetry. In terms of Mecha-
nism Design, the buyer’s private information is represented by so-called types. That is, the buyer’s
identity is an element of a known set of types P and specified by a probability distribution on P.
The distribution of types is assumed to be common knowledge, in particular also to the seller. We
consider the case where the buyer has single-dimensional private information, represented by the
type p ∈ P.
In case of information asymmetry, the seller offers a menu of contracts, typically one contract
for each of the possible buyer types. First, the optimal menu is determined by solving a certain
optimisation problem, which we will discuss in later sections. Second, this menu is offered to the
buyer. Finally, the buyer either chooses to accept a contract of the menu or refuses the offer,
depending on what is most beneficial for the buyer. Note that the buyer can lie about his true type
and choose any contract, which complicates the seller’s optimisation process.
The modelling of the buyer types P is crucial for the contracting problem. In the Mechanism
Design literature there are two typical choices. First, we have the classical discrete model : a finite
discrete set P = {p1, . . . , pK} ⊆ R for some K ∈ N≥1 (discrete distribution). Here, the menu
consists of K contracts, one for each type. Hence, the buyer chooses from a finite number of
contracts. Second, we have the classical continuous model : a bounded interval P = [
¯
p, p¯] ⊆ R with
p¯ >
¯
p (continuous distribution). Here, the menu is a function that maps every type to a contract.
In other words, infinitely many contracts are offered to the buyer.
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Our goal is to design and analyse a model that combines aspects of both the discrete and
continuous models. For this model, the buyer’s type is continuously distributed on P = [
¯
p, p¯] ⊆ R
with p¯ >
¯
p, but only finitely many contracts are offered. The main motivation for this approach
is that offering finitely many contracts is often preferred in practice, as such menus are easier to
communicate and implement. Furthermore, having only finitely many outcomes to offering the
menu allows decision makers to include contracting in more complex company-wide scenario-based
analyses. The discrete and continuous approaches are not suitable for achieving this goal, which
we will later discuss in more detail. This combination of the discrete and continuous approaches
has received limited attention in the literature, which we will review in the next section.
We present a modelling approach which we call robust pooling in order to achieve the stated
goal. For the robust pooling model, the buyer’s type lies in a bounded interval [
¯
p, p¯], but only
finitely many contracts are offered. First, the seller chooses the number of contracts K ∈ N≥1
that will be offered. Second, he partitions the interval [
¯
p, p¯] into K subintervals denoted by [
¯
pk, p¯k]
for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Third, he designs a menu of K contracts with a single contract intended for
each subinterval [
¯
pk, p¯k]. Finally, he offers the menu to the buyer, as usual. Note that, technically,
the subintervals [
¯
pk, p¯k] should not intersect, i.e., they should be half-open except for the last
subinterval. However, using closed subintervals does not affect the results and simplifies notation.
Our modelling approach has two fundamental properties: pooling of types and robustness.
First, the (discrete) pooling property refers to offering finitely many contracts, and thus offering
the same contract to multiple types, by design. Second, the (continuous) robustness property means
that each type p ∈ P accepts a contract from the menu and that this choice is correctly reflected in
the model (for example in the objective function). In other words, the menu specifies an intended
contract for each type and each type chooses its intended contract. Consequently, the buyer always
accepts a contract from the menu, making the menu robust to the buyer’s private information. In
our case, for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} it is for all types in [
¯
pk, p¯k] most beneficial to choose the k-th
contract.
In our approach, the seller must decide on a partition scheme, i.e., the number of contracts
and an appropriately corresponding partition of [
¯
p, p¯]. The robust pooling model enables us to
determine the effect of different partition schemes, since our model handles an arbitrary number of
contracts and any partition in a natural way. Due to the robustness property, we can evaluate the
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use of different schemes in a fair way by directly comparing the resulting objective values of the
model.
Such a fair comparison is not possible with the classical discrete approach, since varying the
number of contracts also implies changing the distribution of the buyer’s type, effectively changing
which scenarios could happen. Moreover, if the discrete distribution is actually an approximation
of a continuous distribution, then the discrete approach is generally not robust. The classical
continuous approach does not pool types by design and is therefore also unsuitable.
As already hinted, there are several aspects of the robust pooling model to analyse. First,
what is the complexity of the model? In particular, can we identify conditions under which the
model can be solved efficiently? Second, can we quantify the performance of partition schemes? A
natural choice for a partition is the equidistant partition, where [
¯
p, p¯] is partitioned into subintervals
of equal length. However, is the equidistant partition the best possible partition? Also, offering
infinitely many contracts (the continuous approach) results in the best possible objective value
and is partition independent. When using our approach, how many contracts should be offered to
guarantee, say, 95% of this best possible value?
We continue with a literature review of related modelling techniques and contracting problems.
1.1 Connection to the literature
For a general reference for the classical discrete and continuous modelling approaches, see for exam-
ple Laffont and Martimort (2002). To our knowledge, a combination of the discrete and continuous
approaches, such as our robust pooling model, has received limited attention in the literature.
Bergemann et al. (2011) consider a linear-quadratic model based on Mussa and Rosen (1978), but
with limited communication between the seller and the buyer. The limited communication implies
that only a menu with a limited number of contracts can be offered. Their approach is effectively
a restricted form of the classical continuous approach, where the menu is restricted to have finitely
many contracts. The resulting model satisfies our desired pooling and robustness properties. They
are able to reformulate the problem into a mean square minimisation problem and apply Quanti-
sation theory (Lloyd-Max conditions) to determine the optimal menu of contracts and the optimal
partition scheme. In particular, they show that compared to offering infinitely many contracts the
loss in performance is of the order Θ(1/K2) when using K optimal contracts.
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The same modelling approach is used in Wong (2014), who analyses a more general version of
the non-linear pricing problem in Bergemann et al. (2011). He determines general results on the
loss of performance when offering K optimal contracts. Among other results, he proves that the
loss in performance is of the order Θ(1/K2) under more general assumptions than Bergemann et al.
(2011).
We shall refer to the modelling approach used in Bergemann et al. (2011) and Wong (2014) as
the limited variety model. In general, our robust pooling model is more restrictive than the limited
variety model, since we partition (pool) types into subintervals a priori. Nevertheless, we use our
robust pooling approach for the following reasons.
First, the robust pooling model has an added benefit regarding information extraction. The
seller can extract private information from the buyer by observing the buyer’s chosen contract.
Recall that by design the k-th contract is chosen by all types in [
¯
pk, p¯k]. Thus, after observing
the buyer’s choice, the seller can narrow down the buyer’s type to one of the subintervals of the
partition. Since the used partition is a decision made by the seller, he is able to control the accuracy
of said identification in a natural and intuitive way. In general, the limited variety model cannot
guarantee such structured information extraction.
Second, an implicit goal of offering a limited number of contracts is to have a simple mechanism.
Partitioning [
¯
p, p¯] using a certain heuristic (e.g., equidistantly or according to some ‘square-root’
rule) is simple and intuitive, and could have a decent performance. That is, the formulation
promotes the experimentation with partition schemes. Moreover, it could be that the loss in
performance by restricting to subintervals is negligible compared to the loss by offering a limited
number of contracts. Of course, it has to be researched whether this is the case.
The robust pooling model is also related to Robust Optimisation (see Ben-Tal et al. (2009)).
That is, our model can be interpreted as a Robust Optimisation variant for the discrete model,
where each subinterval [
¯
pk, p¯k] is the so-called uncertainty set of type pk. This will be further
discussed when we have formalised the model.
In the recent years, there has been an increase in the application of Robust Optimisation to
Mechanism Design models in the literature. For examples, see Aghassi and Bertsimas (2006),
Bandi and Bertsimas (2014), Bergemann and Morris (2005) and Pınar and Kızılkale (2016). The
main focus lies on making contracting models robust to the distribution of the buyer’s type, i.e.,
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it only depends on which types can occur and not on any probabilities. To our knowledge, Robust
Optimisation has not been applied to obtain a model similar to our robust pooling model.
1.2 Contribution
Our contributions are as follows. We present a new modelling approach for contracting problems
called robust pooling. Our approach distinguishes itself from the classical discrete and continuous
models by having a continuous distribution for the buyer’s type and offering a menu with finitely
many contracts. Its two fundamental properties are pooling of types by design and robustness.
Compared to the limited variety model, we use a partition to pool types a priori. We restrict
the analysis to single-dimensional types, but the robust pooling principle can be applied to more
general settings.
We show that under certain assumptions robust pooling models have a simplified reformulation
or can even be solved efficiently. The assumptions required for this analysis are frequently used
in the literature. Our analysis also results in new insights into the robustness of the classical
discrete modelling approach when a discrete distribution is used as an approximation for a buyer’s
type with a continuous distribution. These results are derived for both utility maximisation and
cost minimisation variants of the contracting problem, which are not equivalent under the made
assumptions.
In the robust pooling approach, the seller must decide on a partition scheme, i.e., the number
of contracts and an appropriately corresponding partition of [
¯
p, p¯]. Due to the robustness property,
we can compare the performance of different partition schemes in a straightforward and fair way.
However, these performances are difficult, if not impossible, to determine analytically in general.
Therefore, we consider two specific problems. The first problem is based on a decreasing marginal
utility for the buyer as his order quantity increases. It is a generalisation of the linear-quadratic
model considered in Wong (2014). As such, we can relate our results to his. The second problem
uses the classical Economic Order Quantity setting. It is the robust pooling variant of, for example,
Corbett and De Groote (2000) and Voigt and Inderfurth (2011). To our knowledge, robust pooling
has not been applied before to this setting.
For both problems, we derive closed-form formulas for the optimal menu and corresponding
optimal objective value for any number of contracts and any partition. We show that structural
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results and performance measures can be expressed by functions of a single new parameter. Re-
markably, this parameter does not depend on all instance parameters, implying families of instances
with the same structure. Furthermore, we determine the optimal partition scheme, either analyt-
ically or numerically, depending on the problem. In particular, this leads to new insights into
the (sub)optimality of the equidistant partition. Finally, we give performance guarantees for the
equidistant and optimal partitions.
The robust pooling approach has good performances with only a few contracts for the two
considered problems. For example, offering 3 contracts with an optimised partition has a perfor-
mance guarantee of at most a 4% relative gap compared to offering infinitely many contracts. This
validates the concept of our robust pooling approach.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we consider robust pooling
models in the context of utility maximisation. In Section 2.1-2.3 we analyse the model under
certain assumptions. These results are applied in Sections 2.4-2.6 to the mentioned problem based
on a decreasing marginal utility. In Section 3 we perform a similar analysis to cost minimisation
models and apply it to the mentioned problem based on the Economic Order Quantity setting in
Section 3.2. Finally, we conclude our findings in Section 4.
2 Contracting for maximising utility
In this section we consider principal-agent contracting models in the setting of utility maximisation.
We first formalise the robust pooling model in Section 2.1. In Sections 2.2-2.3 we reformulate,
analyse, and solve the model under certain assumptions. Finally, in Sections 2.4-2.6 we consider a
concrete problem based on decreasing marginal utilities and analyse the performance of partitioning
schemes in detail.
2.1 The model
The principal is a seller of products and wants to initiate trade with the agent, referred to as the
buyer. The seller desires to enter a contractual agreement with the buyer to provide the goods.
However, the buyer does not share all his information with the seller, complicating the design of a
contract. Therefore, the seller uses Mechanism Design to construct a menu of contracts such that
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the buyer can be persuaded to order at the seller.
A contract is given by an order quantity x ∈ R≥0 and a side payment z ∈ R from the buyer to
the seller. That is, the contract effectively specifies how many units of product the buyer receives
and for which price. The buyer can refuse any contract, but we assume he acts individually rational
and accepts an offered contract if this is most beneficial to himself.
The buyer has private information, which we assume can be represented by a single parameter
p ∈ R≥0. Let φB(x|p) be the utility of order quantity x for the buyer with private parameter p.
Likewise, φS(x) is the seller’s utility for order quantity x. By default there is no contract (no trade)
between the seller and the buyer, resulting in a default utility of zero for the buyer. Therefore, a
contract (x, z) is accepted by the buyer if its net utility is non-negative:
φB(x|p)− z ≥ 0.
This is called the Individual Rationality (IR) constraint. The difficulty in designing a suitable
contract is that the private utility parameter p is not shared with the seller. We assume that the
parameter p follows a continuous distribution with strictly positive density function ω : [
¯
p, p¯]→ R>0
on the interval [
¯
p, p¯] ⊆ R≥0 with p¯ >
¯
p. This distribution is known to the seller. Each p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] is
called a (buyer) type.
Instead of offering a single contract, the seller designs a menu consisting of K ∈ N≥1 contracts
for the buyer to choose from. The number of contracts K is a decision made by the seller and
plays a central role in the results to come. We define K = {1, . . . ,K}. Next, the seller partitions
[
¯
p, p¯] into K subintervals [
¯
pk, p¯k] with p¯k >
¯
pk. We call this a proper K-partition. Finally, the seller
constructs K contracts, where contract (xk, zk) is designed for subinterval [
¯
pk, p¯k] for each k ∈ K.
The contracts are determined by solving the following optimisation problem:
max
x,z
∑
k∈K
(∫ p¯k
¯
pk
ω(p)dp
)
(φS(xk) + zk) , (2.1)
s.t. φB(xk|pk)− zk ≥ 0, ∀ pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k], k ∈ K, (2.2)
φB(xk|pk)− zk ≥ φB(xl|pk)− zl, ∀ pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k], k, l ∈ K, (2.3)
xk ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ K.
We refer to this model as the robust pooling model. Constraints (2.2) specify that contract (xk, zk)
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must be individually rational for the buyer with respect to all corresponding types pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k].
Constraints (2.3) are the Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints. These ensure that the buyer
with type pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k] prefers and chooses the intended contract (xk, zk) over all the other contracts
in the menu. Recall that the buyer chooses the most beneficial contract for himself from the menu.
To be precise, we need the following assumption, which is conventional in the Mechanism Design
literature. If the IC constraint (2.3) where type pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k] compares contract (xk, zk) to contract
(xl, zl) holds with equality, then type pk is indifferent between contracts (xk, zk) and (xl, zl). In
this case, we assume that the seller can convince the buyer to choose contract (xk, zk).
Thus, a buyer with type pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k] always chooses contract (xk, zk) by design of the menu.
This is related to the well-known Revelation Principle (see Laffont and Martimort (2002) and
Myerson (1982)). This principle states that without loss of optimality the seller can restrict his
design to incentive-compatible direct coordination mechanisms and obtain a truthful choice of
contract by the buyer. In other words, for a buyer with type pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k] it is a weakly-dominant
strategy to choose contract (xk, zk).
With this insight, we return to the robust pooling model. Notice that
ωk ≡
∫ p¯k
¯
pk
ω(p)dp ∈ (0, 1] (2.4)
for k ∈ K defines the probability ωk that the buyer’s type lies in [
¯
pk, p¯k] and consequently that the
buyer chooses contract (xk, zk). The seller’s objective (2.1) is to maximise his own expected net
utility, which is the weighted sum of his valuation φS(xk) of the order quantity xk and the received
side payment zk.
The robust pooling model has a strong connection to Robust Optimisation models (see Ben-Tal
et al. (2009)). Our model has finitely many decision variables and infinitely many constraints.
Furthermore, for k ∈ K the interval [
¯
pk, p¯k] can be interpreted as the so-called uncertainty interval
for pk. Thus, the robust pooling model can be seen as a Robust Optimisation variant of the classical
discrete model with K uncertain parameters p1, . . . , pK . We will not require Robust Optimisation
techniques in the following sections. However, these techniques can be useful to analyse more
complex robust pooling models.
To conclude, the robust pooling model pools the possible buyer types p into finitely many
subintervals, enabling the seller to offer finitely many contracts in the menu. Furthermore, the
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contracts are robust by design, meaning that the buyer will always accept a contract from the
menu for any possible type p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] and this choice is correctly reflected in the objective function.
We emphasize that the number of contracts K and the proper K-partition of [
¯
p, p¯] are decisions
made by the seller. Therefore, if solving the robust pooling model is sufficiently easy, we can focus
on quantifying the effect of the number of contracts and the chosen partition. For example, how
many contracts should be offered to obtain 90% of the maximum possible expected net utility?
Also, the equidistant partition is a natural standard choice, but is it also optimal?
In order to answer such questions, we need to make assumptions and consider explicit models,
as a general approach seems impossible. The first assumption is on the buyer’s utility function.
Assumption 1. The buyer’s utility function is φB(x|p) = ψ(x) + pχ(x), where the functions
ψ : R≥0 → R and χ : R≥0 → R≥0 do not depend on the type p. Moreover, χ is non-decreasing and
non-negative.
Assumption 1 is common in the Mechanism Design literature and allows us to determine struc-
tural results. In Section 2.2 we derive an equivalent and simpler formulation for the robust pooling
model. The performed analysis is used in Section 2.3 to show a certain equivalence between our
robust pooling model and two other models in the literature. Finally, in Sections 2.4-2.6 we analyse
a model in detail where the buyer has a decreasing marginal utility for the products. In particular,
we focus on the performance of partition schemes in those sections.
From this point onwards, we denote a menu of contracts by (x, z), where x = (x1, . . . , xK) and
z = (z1, . . . , zK). A single contract is denoted by (xk, zk) for k ∈ K. Also, we use ωk defined by
(2.4) in the objective instead of the integral notation.
2.2 Reformulation and analysis
Under Assumption 1, we make a change of variables by splitting the side payment into two parts:
zk = ψ(xk) + yk,
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where yk will replace zk as decision variable. Substitution of this definition leads to an equivalent
model with simplified constraints:
max
x,y
∑
k∈K
ωk (φS(xk) + ψ(xk) + yk) ,
s.t. pkχ(xk)− yk ≥ 0, ∀ pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k], k ∈ K, (2.5)
pkχ(xk)− yk ≥ pkχ(xl)− yl, ∀ pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k], k, l ∈ K, (2.6)
xk ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ K.
The benefit of this formulation is that several utility functions can be analysed as one model:
different choices of φS and ψ can lead to the same function φS + ψ. Furthermore, if φS + ψ
is concave and χ linear, this formulation is concave, has linear constraints, and can be solved
efficiently.
We continue with the first structural result for the robust pooling model. Lemma 1 essentially
identifies an embedded dual shortest path problem as in Rochet and Stole (2003) and Vohra (2012).
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, for any feasible x it is optimal to set
yk =
¯
pkχ(xk)−
k−1∑
i=1
(p¯i −
¯
pi)χ(xi) ∀ k ∈ K. (2.7)
Proof. By combining several essential constraints, we can show that many constraints are super-
fluous and that some must hold with equality. See Appendix A.1 for the details.
Lemma 1 allows us to eliminate the variable y (or z) and obtain an optimisation problem in
terms of x. However, in order to do so, we need to be able to express the feasible region in terms
of x. This is shown in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 1, any x is feasible if and only if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xK .
Proof. Use Lemma 1, combine the IC constraints, and use that χ is non-decreasing. The details
are in Appendix A.1.
In Mechanism Design, the buyer’s type is often related to efficiency: type pk > pl gets more
utility from a fixed order quantity than type pl, i.e., φB(x|pk) ≥ φB(x|pl) for all x ≥ 0. Thus, type
pk is more efficient. Lemma 2 shows that the order quantities are weakly ordered in terms of the
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corresponding type’s efficiency: a less efficient type is offered a lower or equal order quantity than
a more efficient type.
We can now combine our results to get an equivalent and much simpler formulation for the robust
pooling model under our assumptions, see Theorem 3. Notice in particular that the reformulation
has finitely many linear constraints.
Theorem 3. Under Assumption 1, the robust pooling model with infinitely many constraints is
equivalent to the following problem with finitely many and linear constraints:
max
0≤x1≤···≤xK
∑
k∈K
ωk
(
φS(xk) + ψ(xk) +
(
¯
pk − (p¯k −
¯
pk)
K∑
i=k+1
ωi
ωk
)
χ(xk)
)
. (2.8)
Proof. By Lemma 1 we can substitute the optimal formula (2.7) for y into the optimisation model.
By Lemma 2 we conclude that the IR and IC constraints hold if and only if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xK .
This leads to the equivalent optimisation problem
max
0≤x1≤···≤xK
∑
k∈K
ωk
(
φS(xk) + ψ(xk) +
¯
pkχ(xk)−
k−1∑
i=1
(p¯i −
¯
pi)χ(xi)
)
,
which can be rewritten into to formulation of the theorem by collecting the terms of xk.
The computational complexity of (2.8) depends on the shape of φS + ψ and χ. Furthermore,
(2.8) allows for specialised (numerical) solvers, since the feasible region is independent of φS + ψ
and χ.
We make additional assumptions to determine a family of explicitly solvable robust pooling
models. That is, we are able to derive explicit formulas for the optimal menu of contracts. The
following assumptions are a balance between the generality of the model and the brevity of the
analysis, and can be weakened up to a certain extent to obtain similar results.
Assumption 2. The buyer has zero utility for ordering zero units of product: φB(0|p) = 0 for all
p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯], implying ψ(0) = χ(0) = 0.
Assumption 3. The function φS + ψ is strictly concave and differentiable on R≥0. The function
χ is given by χ(x) = x.
Assumption 4. The distribution on the private parameter p is uniform: ω(p) = 1/(p¯ −
¯
p), so
ωk = (p¯k −
¯
pk)/(p¯−
¯
p) for all k ∈ K.
12
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Assuming φB(0|p) = 0 (Assumption 2) ensures that there is no side payment if a contract
specifies no trade, i.e., xk = 0 implies zk = 0. This is in line with the default situation, where the
absence of trade implies zero utility for the buyer. Assumption 3 is needed to make (2.8) a concave
maximisation problem that can be solved efficiently, for example using interior-point or cutting-
plane methods (see Bertsekas (2015) and Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004)). Finally, the uniformity
of p (Assumption 4) is significantly restrictive, but allows for a manageable exact analysis with
closed-form formulas.
With the imposed additional structure, we can solve (2.8) exactly, see Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. Under Assumptions 1-4, the robust pooling model is equivalent to the following concave
problem:
max
0≤x1≤···≤xK
∑
k∈K
p¯k −
¯
pk
p¯−
¯
p
(
φS(xk) + ψ(xk) + (p¯k +
¯
pk − p¯)xk
)
.
The optimal order quantities are given by
xk =

0 if k < k∗(
d
dx(φS + ψ)
)−1
(p¯− p¯k −
¯
pk) if k
∗ ≤ k ≤ kˆ
∞ if k > kˆ
,
and satisfy 0 < xk∗ < · · · < xkˆ <∞. Here, the index of the first non-zero order quantity is
k∗ = min
{
K + 1,min
{
k ∈ K : p¯k +
¯
pk − p¯ > − d
dx
(φS + ψ)(0)
}}
,
and the index of last finite order quantity is
kˆ = max
{
0,max
{
k ∈ K : p¯k +
¯
pk − p¯ < − lim
x→∞
d
dx
(φS + ψ)(x)
}}
.
Proof. We specialise Theorem 3 under the stated assumptions and solve the resulting concave
optimisation problem. See Appendix A.1 for the details.
Theorem 4 defines two indices k∗ and kˆ. Typically, the index kˆ of last finite order quantity
satisfies kˆ = K and can be omitted. If kˆ < K then the optimal objective value is ∞, which is
unrealistic and indicates that the utility functions should be reconsidered. On the other hand, the
index k∗ of the first non-zero order quantity plays an essential role as we shall see in Section 2.4.
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If k∗ > 1 then (xk, zk) = (0, 0) for k < k∗, i.e., there is no trade with types p ∈ [
¯
p,
¯
pk∗).
In conclusion, we have shown how to reformulate and solve certain robust pooling models for
maximising utility. In particular, the analysis allows us to prove in Section 2.3 that the robust
pooling model under Assumption 1 is equivalent to other models from the literature. After that
intermezzo, we continue in Section 2.4 to analyse the effect of the chosen partition for a model
based on decreasing marginal utility. This model satisfies Assumptions 1-4, implying that we can
apply Theorem 4.
2.3 Equivalences to other models
The structure of the reformulated robust pooling model (2.8) might be recognised by those familiar
with either classical discrete contracting models or the limited variety model of Bergemann et al.
(2011) and Wong (2014). In fact, under Assumption 1 there is an equivalence between these three
models. We formalise and discuss this further in this section.
2.3.1 Pooling and robustness implies partitioning
In the robust pooling approach we partition [
¯
p, p¯] to obtain pooling of types, i.e., a menu with
finitely many contracts. As mentioned in Section 1, the limited variety model of Bergemann et al.
(2011) and Wong (2014) achieves robustness and pooling without partitioning [
¯
p, p¯] a priori. The
limited variety model simply restricts the menu to include finitely many contracts. Thus, their
approach is more general than our robust pooling. However, in this section we show that under
Assumption 1 both approaches are equivalent, i.e., they have the same optimal solution.
Consider a menu of K contracts (xk, zk) that satisfies the pooling and robustness properties.
Consequently, each type p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] chooses a contract from the menu. Without loss of generality,
each contract is chosen by some types. Let pˆk be the most inefficient type that chooses contract
(xk, zk) for k ∈ K. By changing the index of the contracts, we have
¯
p = pˆ1 < . . . < pˆK ≤ p¯ without
loss of generality. This implies that
φB(xk|pˆk) ≥ zk, ∀ k ∈ K,
φB(xk|pˆk)− φB(xl|pˆk) ≥ zk − zl, ∀ k, l ∈ K. (2.9)
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We will prove that, in fact, types p ≥ pˆk prefer contract (xk, zk) over contracts (xl, zl) with l < k
by verifying that the respective IR and IC constraints hold. By adding (2.9) for k, l ∈ K and by
Assumption 1, we have
0 ≤ φB(xk|pˆk)− φB(xl|pˆk) + φB(xl|pˆl)− φB(xk|pˆl)
= (pˆk − pˆl)(χ(xk)− χ(xl)), ∀ k, l ∈ K.
Therefore, χ(xk) ≥ χ(xl) for l < k, since pˆk > pˆl by definition. Using these results, we obtain for
all k ∈ K that
φB(xk|p) = ψ(xk) + pχ(xk) ≥ ψ(xk) + pˆkχ(xk) = φB(xk|pˆk) ≥ zk, ∀ p ≥ pˆk,
and
φB(xk|p)− φB(xl|p) = ψ(xk)− ψ(xl) + p(χ(xk)− χ(xl))
≥ ψ(xk)− ψ(xl) + pˆk(χ(xk)− χ(xl))
= φB(xk|pˆk)− φB(xl|pˆk) ≥ zk − zl, ∀ l < k, p ≥ pˆk.
These inequalities correspond to IR and IC constraints. They imply that types p ≥ pˆk prefer
contract (xk, zk) over contracts (xl, zl) with l < k. Using the definition of pˆk, we conclude that
contract (xk, zk) must be chosen by types {p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] : pˆk ≤ p < pˆk+1}.
Thus, under Assumption 1 any menu that satisfies the pooling and robustness properties effec-
tively partitions [
¯
p, p¯] and pools the respective types, exactly as our robust pooling approach.
2.3.2 Robustness of the discrete approach
Suppose the buyer’s type p follows a continuous distribution on [
¯
p, p¯] and the seller wants to offer
only finitely many contracts in the menu. Of course, our robust pooling approach is designed for
this task, but can we also apply the classical discrete approach? That is, can the seller select
K representatives from [
¯
p, p¯], assign appropriate probabilities to the representatives, apply the
classical discrete approach, and achieve the same robust result as our robust pooling approach? In
this section we show that the discrete approach can be robust under Assumption 1.
First, if a discrete model satisfies Assumption 1 and is robust we conclude that it must be
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equivalent to the robust pooling model as shown in Section 2.3.1. Second, we prove that under
Assumption 1 the robust pooling model is equivalent to a specifically constructed discrete model.
The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 show that many constraints are redundant. Of all IR constraints (2.5)
only
¯
p1χ(x1)−y1 ≥ 0 is needed. Of all IC constraints (2.6) we need
¯
pkχ(xk)−yk ≥
¯
pkχ(xk−1)−yk−1
for all k ∈ K and the constraint x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xK . The non-decreasing x can be enforced by replacing
it with the IC constraints
¯
pkχ(xk) − yk ≥
¯
pkχ(xk+1) − yk+1 for all k ∈ K. Adding a few more
redundant IR and IC constraints, gives the following equivalent optimisation problem:
max
x,y
∑
k∈K
ωk (φS(xk) + ψ(xk) + yk) ,
s.t.
¯
pkχ(xk)− yk ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ K,
¯
pkχ(xk)− yk ≥
¯
pkχ(xl)− yl, ∀ k, l ∈ K,
xk ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ K.
This is the classical discrete variant for the contracting problem, where each subinterval [
¯
pk, p¯k] is
represented by its most inefficient type
¯
pk and this type has probability ωk.
To conclude, the discrete model satisfying Assumption 1 has a hidden robustness provided
that the representative of each subinterval [
¯
pk, p¯k] is its most inefficient type
¯
pk and this type has
probability ωk. Consequently, a robust discrete model using two types to approximate [
¯
p, p¯] should
not choose the extreme types
¯
p and p¯ as representatives, since the contract for type p¯ will be chosen
with probability zero. Hence, effectively only a single contract is used.
2.4 Decreasing marginal utility problem
In this section we consider a specific contracting model that fits our robust pooling setting of
Section 2.1 and can be analysed in detail. The model is based around the concept that the marginal
utility of a product decreases for the buyer as the order quantity increases.
For order quantity x ∈ R≥0 the buyer’s marginal utility of an additional product is given by
p − rxn for some fixed parameters r, n ∈ R>0. Here, p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] ⊆ R≥0 with p¯ >
¯
p is the private
parameter of the buyer, as introduced in Section 2.1. This leads to the following utility function
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for the buyer:
φB(x|p) =
∫ x
0
(p− run)du = − 1n+1rxn+1 + px ≡ ψ(x) + pχ(x).
The buyer’s utility function is strictly concave in x and is negative for large order quantities.
Therefore, the buyer has a finite individually optimal order quantity. For example, this could be
the case if excess products are difficult to dispose of.
The seller’s utility function is linear in the order quantity: φS(x) = Px, where P ∈ R>0 is a fixed
parameter. Therefore, the seller simply wants to sell as many products as possible. Consequently,
ordering no products leads to zero utility for both the seller and the buyer.
For the entire section, we assume that the distribution of p is uniform, i.e., we make Assump-
tion 4. The seller designs a menu of contracts using the robust pooling methodology described in
Section 2.1. We refer to this problem as the Decreasing Marginal Utility (DMU-n) problem.
First, we derive the optimal solution and optimal objective value in Section 2.4.1. Second, we
show how to express relative performance measures as 1-dimensional functions in Section 2.4.2.
Finally, we discuss properties of the optimal partition in Section 2.4.3. These results hold the
DMU-n problem for any n ∈ R>0 and are applied in Sections 2.5 and 2.6 for n = 1 and n = 2,
respectively. Note that the DMU-1 model is essentially the same model as in Wong (2014).
2.4.1 Optimal solution and objective value
Since the DMU-n model satisfies Assumptions 1-4, we can invoke Theorem 4 to obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 5. For given K ∈ N≥1 and proper K-partition of [
¯
p, p¯], the optimal solution for the
DMU-n problem is given by
xk =

0 if k < k∗
n
√
P+p¯k+
¯
pk−p¯
r if k ≥ k∗
and zk =
¯
pkxk − 1n+1rxn+1k −
k−1∑
i=1
(p¯i −
¯
pi)xi.
where k∗ = min{k ∈ K : P − p¯ + p¯k +
¯
pk > 0}. Thus, trade occurs for types p ∈ [
¯
pk∗ , p¯]. Also,
0 = x1 = · · · = xk∗−1 < xk∗ < · · · < xK <∞ and z1 = · · · = zk∗−1 = 0.
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The corresponding optimal objective value ΓK is
ΓK =
n
n+ 1
1
n
√
r
K∑
k=k∗
p¯k −
¯
pk
p¯−
¯
p
(
P − p¯+ p¯k +
¯
pk
)n+1
n . (2.10)
Proof. We apply Theorem 4 where
d
dx
(φS + ψ)(x) = P − rxn =⇒ d
dx
(φS + ψ)(0) = P.
Since P−p¯+p¯K+
¯
pK = P+
¯
pK > 0, we get k
∗ = min{k ∈ K : P−p¯+p¯k+
¯
pk > 0}. Furthermore, since
ψ decreases super-linearly we have kˆ = K. In other words, all contracts are sensible (xk, zk < ∞)
and at least one contract instigates trade (xK > 0). The results now follow from Theorem 4.
The optimal objective value ΓK is the main focus in the results to come. Notice that Γ1 is
independent of any partition, since there is no partition for a single contract (K = 1). For a
given instance, Γ1 is the lowest possible expected utility for the seller when using robust pooling.
Furthermore, k∗ = 1 for K = 1, since P − p¯+ p¯K +
¯
pK = P +
¯
pK = P +
¯
p > 0. Thus, the optimal
objective value for K = 1 simplifies to
Γ1 =
n
n+ 1
1
n
√
r
(
P +
¯
p
)n+1
n .
Likewise, using infinitely many contracts, i.e., letting K → ∞ using sensible partitions, also
leads to an objective value independent of any partition. We denote this value by Γ∞, which is the
highest possible expected utility for the seller when using robust pooling:
Γ∞ =
n
n+ 1
1
n
√
r
∫ p¯
p∗
1
p¯−
¯
p
(P − p¯+ 2p)n+1n dp,
where p∗ = min{p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] : P − p¯ + 2p ≥ 0} is the continuous version of k∗. That is, p∗ is the
threshold for which the optimal order quantity is non-zero. To be precise, we have
p∗ = max{
¯
p, 12(p¯− P )}.
Therefore, Γ∞ can be written as
Γ∞ =

n
n+1
n
2n+1
1
2(p¯−
¯
p)
1
n√r
(
(P + p¯)
2n+1
n − (P − p¯+ 2
¯
p
) 2n+1
n
)
if p∗ =
¯
p
n
n+1
n
2n+1
1
2(p¯−
¯
p)
1
n√r (P + p¯)
2n+1
n if p∗ = 12(p¯− P )
.
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Notice that ΓK is the composite midpoint rule for numerical integration applied to the integrand
of Γ∞. In other words, determining the optimal partition for robust pooling is equal to choosing the
optimal partition for the composite midpoint rule. For more details on this numerical integration,
see for example Dragomir et al. (1998) and Kirmaci (2004). Therefore, we could apply results from
numerical integration to obtain performance guarantees for ΓK compared to Γ∞. In particular,
this insight implies that loss in performance (the difference between ΓK and Γ∞) is of the order
O(1/K2). This is in line with the results of Bergemann et al. (2011) and Wong (2014). However,
by analysing the performance of robust pooling in more detail, we can determine the achieved
performances exactly.
2.4.2 Performance measures
For a given partition, we would like to compare the optimal objective value ΓK for different number
of contracts K. In order to do so, it is useful to redefine the partition as follows:
¯
pk =
¯
p+ δk−1(p¯−
¯
p) and p¯k =
¯
p+ δk(p¯−
¯
p),
where δ0 = 0, δk ∈ [0, 1] for k = 1, . . . ,K − 1, and δK = 1. Notice that δ0 corresponds to
¯
p and
δK to p¯. Furthermore, δk for k = 1, . . . ,K − 1 encode the chosen points to partition [
¯
p, p¯]. Thus, a
proper K-partition satisfies 0 = δ0 < · · · < δK = 1. We denote the partition by ∆ = {δ0, . . . , δK}.
Substitution of this definition in (2.10) gives
ΓK =
n
n+ 1
1
n
√
r
K∑
k=k∗
(δk − δk−1)
(
P +
¯
p+ (δk + δk−1 − 1)(p¯−
¯
p)
)n+1
n . (2.11)
With this reformulated expression, we can for example consider the improvement of offering K
contracts compared to a single contract:
ΓK
Γ1
=
K∑
k=k∗
(δk − δk−1)
(
1 + (δk + δk−1 − 1)
p¯−
¯
p
P +
¯
p
)n+1
n
.
The parameter (p¯ −
¯
p)/(P +
¯
p) plays a central role in all the following analysis. We call this
parameter the instance parameter α ∈ R>0:
α =
p¯−
¯
p
P +
¯
p
.
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We will see that all structural results can be expressed in terms of α, i.e., it captures the essence
of the instance. Returning to improvement ΓK/Γ1, we get
ΓK
Γ1
=
K∑
k=k∗
(δk − δk−1)
(
1 + (δk + δk−1 − 1)α
)n+1
n
.
In terms of α, we have k∗ = min
{
k ∈ K : δk + δk−1 > α−1α
}
, since
P − p¯+ p¯k +
¯
pk > 0 ⇐⇒ P +
¯
p+ (δk + δk−1 − 1)(p¯−
¯
p) > 0
⇐⇒ 1 + (δk + δk−1 − 1)α > 0 ⇐⇒ δk + δk−1 > α−1α .
Thus, if 0 < α ≤ 1 any partition satisfies k∗ = 1, i.e., all contracts instigate trade between the
seller and buyer.
It is now straightforward to determine the following bounds on the relative improvement for
any K > 1 and proper K-partition:
lim
α→0
ΓK − Γ1
Γ1
= 0 and lim
α→∞
ΓK − Γ1
Γ1
=∞.
Hence, for any arbitrarily large relative improvement there exists an instance that exceeds this
relative improvement. In particular, this holds for two contracts and any proper 2-partition.
It is useful to introduce a normalisation factor ν:
ν = n+1n
n
√
r(p¯−
¯
p)−
n+1
n .
This leads to the more manageable formula
νΓK =
K∑
k=k∗
(δk − δk−1)
(
1
α + δk + δk−1 − 1
)n+1
n . (2.12)
The normalisation factor ν will cancel out in relative performance measures, allowing us to use
(2.12) in these expressions.
In similar vein, we can express Γ∞ in terms of α. First, we focus on p∗ and realise that
¯
p ≥ 12(p¯− P ) ⇐⇒ P +
¯
p− (p¯−
¯
p) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ 1− α ≥ 0.
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Thus, we have
p∗ =
¯
p if α ≤ 1
1
2(p¯− P ) if α > 1
.
For 0 < α ≤ 1 this leads to p∗ =
¯
p and
νΓ∞|0<α≤1 = n
2(2n+ 1)
(
( 1α + 1)
2n+1
n − ( 1α − 1)
2n+1
n
)
. (2.13)
Similarly, for α > 1 we have p∗ = 12(p¯− P ) and
νΓ∞|α>1 = n
2(2n+ 1)
( 1α + 1)
2n+1
n . (2.14)
Notice that for α = 1 (2.13) and (2.14) give the same value, as expected. Furthermore, realise that
νΓK and νΓ∞ are completely determined by α. However, for a fixed α the values ΓK and Γ∞ can
take on any value in (0,∞) by changing the parameter r.
The main benefit of robust pooling is the finite number of contracts in the menu. However,
limiting the number of contracts will typically come at the cost of having a lower expected utility
for the seller. Therefore, the main performance measure of interest is the pooling performance
ΓK/Γ∞, which measures the fraction of expected utility achieved by offering K contracts in terms
of the maximum obtainable expected utility Γ∞.
With the above analysis, we can express relative performance measures as 1-dimensional func-
tions of α. Hence, we are able to make graphs of performance measures in terms of α and determine
performance bounds. This requires us to make n ∈ R>0 explicit and choose a partition scheme (see
Sections 2.5 and 2.6). Before we do so, we determine general properties of an optimal partition for
the DMU-n problem.
2.4.3 Properties of an optimal partition
A partition is equidistant if it partitions [
¯
p, p¯] into equally sized subintervals. That is, we have
δequik = k/K, or equivalently δ
equi
k+1 − δequik = 1/K for k = 1, . . . ,K − 1. The equidistant partition
∆equi is a natural default choice, especially in numerical integration literature. However, is it the
optimal partition for the DMU-n problem, i.e., does it maximise ΓK?
First of all, one should realise that the optimality of partitions is not affected by the normal-
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isation factor ν and thus only depends on the instance parameter α. Consequently, we can work
with νΓK to simplify notation. For the equidistant partitioning, (2.12) becomes
νΓequiK =
1
K
K∑
k=k∗
(
1
α +
2k−1
K − 1
)n+1
n . (2.15)
With the equidistant partition, the index k∗ can be determined as follows:
δequik + δ
equi
k−1 >
α−1
α ⇐⇒
2k − 1
K
> α−1α ⇐⇒ k > 12
(
1 +K
(
α−1
α
))
=⇒ k∗ = max{1, ⌊1 + 12 (1 +K (1− 1α))⌋} .
It is useful to specify this range of k∗ with respect to α, which depends on the parity of K. For K
odd we have k∗ ∈ {1, . . . , 12(K + 1)} and
k∗ =

1 if α ∈
(
0, KK−1
)
k if α ∈
[
K
K−(2k−3) ,
K
K−(2k−1)
)
for some k ∈ {2, . . . , 12(K − 1)}
1
2(K + 1) if α ∈
[
K
2 ,∞
) .
For K even the range is k∗ ∈ {1, . . . , 12K + 1} and
k∗ =

1 if α ∈
(
0, KK−1
)
k if α ∈
[
K
K−(2k−3) ,
K
K−(2k−1)
)
for some k ∈ {2, . . . , 12K}
1
2K + 1 if α ∈ [K,∞)
.
Naturally, these properties do not hold for a partition in general.
Intuitively, if k∗ ≥ 3 for the equidistant partition, there is an inefficiency in the corresponding
optimal menu of contracts. For k∗ ≥ 3 we are offering the contract (x, z) = (0, 0) multiple times.
These duplicate contracts in the menu are pointless and can be used more efficiently by changing
them. The next lemma confirms this intuition.
Lemma 6. For any K ∈ N≥1 an optimal partition must satisfy 0 = δ0 < δ1 < · · · < δK−1 < δK = 1
and k∗ ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. The proof first ensures k∗ ∈ {1, 2} by shifting partition points δk to the right and then
perturbs (-shifts) coinciding partition points to improve the partition. The details are given in
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Appendix A.2.
Corollary 7. For K ∈ N>3 the equidistant partition is suboptimal if α ≥ K/(K − 3).
Proof. For K > 3 and for α ≥ K/(K − 3) we have k∗ ≥ 3, which is suboptimal by Lemma 6.
Corollary 7 does not prove or disprove whether the equidistant partition can be optimal at all.
In the next sections, Sections 2.5 and 2.6, we consider the DMU-n problem for n = 1 and n = 2 and
provide the answer to this question. Note that a general formula for the optimal partition seems
impossible. The difficulty in finding the optimal partition becomes clearer in the next sections.
2.5 Application to the DMU-1 problem
In this section we specialise the results of Section 2.4 to the DMU-1 problem (n = 1). Here, the
buyer has a linearly decreasing marginal utility for the products, which leads to a quadratic utility
function φB. The DMU-1 problem is essentially the same as the considered model in Wong (2014).
We extend and complete his analysis by considering all possible instances, relating structural results
to the instance parameter α, and also evaluating the performance of the equidistant partition.
As we will see, the DMU-1 problem is special compared to other DMU-n problems in the
sense that the optimal partition has an exceptional structure and is relatively straightforward to
determine. We will first derive the optimal partition for DMU-1 in Section 2.5.1. In Section 2.5.2
we analyse the performance of the equidistant and optimal partitions in terms of the number of
contracts K.
2.5.1 Optimal partition
Recall that for any proper K-partition of [
¯
p, p¯] the normalised optimal objective value is given by
(2.12), which for the DMU-1 problem is
νΓK =
K∑
k=k∗
(δk − δk−1)
(
1
α + δk + δk−1 − 1
)2
,
where k∗ = min{k ∈ K : δk + δk−1 > α−1α }. We will now optimise the partition to maximise ΓK .
By Lemma 6, we know that the optimal partition satisfies 0 = δ0 < · · · < δK = 1 and k∗ ∈ {1, 2}.
The following theorem gives the optimal partition for the DMU-1 problem.
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Theorem 8. For K ∈ N≥1 the optimal partition ∆opt for the DMU-1 problem is given by
δoptk =

k
K if α <
K
K−1
1− K−k2K−1
(
1
α + 1
)
if α ≥ KK−1
for k ∈ {2, . . . ,K − 1}.
Hence, for α < K/(K − 1) the equidistant partition is optimal and all contracts instigate trade
(k∗ = 1). For α ≥ K/(K−1) the equidistant partition is suboptimal and a single contract instigates
no trade (k∗ = 2).
Proof. We fix k∗ either to 1 or 2 and maximize ΓK by setting its gradient to zero. The resulting
systems of equalities are linear and can easily be solved. The final step is to check the feasibility
of the obtained solutions. See Appendix A.3 for the details.
The result of Theorem 8 is quite remarkable: for α < K/(K−1) the equidistant partition is the
optimal partition. From Corollary 7 we know that the equidistant partition is not always optimal.
Therefore, we expected that the equidistant partition is never optimal or optimal in the limit, e.g.,
for α → 0 or α → ∞. However, the equidistant partition is optimal for any instance satisfying
α < K/(K − 1). For α ≥ K/(K − 1) it turns out that we effectively only have to optimise δ1, since
it is optimal to partition the remaining subinterval [δ1, 1] equidistantly. This fact can be verified
from the formula or the stationarity conditions mentioned in the proof of Theorem 8.
We will show that the optimal objective value ΓoptK approximates Γ∞ with an almost correctly
shaped function of α when using the optimal partition. This does not hold for the equidistant
partition, which gives additional insights into why it is sometimes suboptimal. The details are as
follows. For 0 < α ≤ 1 the normalised objective value νΓ∞ is given by (2.13), which simplifies to
νΓ∞|0<α≤1 = 16
(
( 1α + 1)
3 − ( 1α − 1)3
)
= 1
α2
+ 13 . (2.16)
For 0 < α < K/(K − 1), which implies 0 < α ≤ 1, we use (2.12) for the equidistant partition:
νΓequiK |0<α< KK−1
= 1K
K∑
k=1
(
1
α +
2k−1
K − 1
)2
= 1
α2
+ 13(1− 1K2 ).
Hence, νΓequiK is of the correct order Θ(α
−2) for 0 < α ≤ 1 compared to νΓ∞, but there is an error
in the constant. Now consider α ≥ K/(K − 1). For α > 1, which is implied by α ≥ K/(K − 1),
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(2.14) simplifies to
νΓ∞|α>1 = 16( 1α + 1)3. (2.17)
This is not of the same order as νΓequiK , which is Θ(α
−2) for any α > 0. The optimal partition
satisfies
δoptk − δoptk−1 =
1
2K − 1
(
1
α
+ 1
)
=
1
2K − 1
(
P + p¯
p¯−
¯
p
)
,
P +
¯
p+ (δoptk + δ
opt
k−1 − 1)(p¯−
¯
p) =
(
1− 2K − 2k + 1
2K − 1
)
(P + p¯) =
2(k − 1)
2K − 1 (P + p¯).
Therefore, the corresponding optimal objective value (2.11) is
ΓoptK |α≥ KK−1
=
1
2r
(P + p¯)3
p¯−
¯
p
K∑
k=2
(2(k − 1))2
(2K − 1)3 =
1
2r
(P + p¯)3
p¯−
¯
p
2(K − 1)K
3(2K − 1)2 ,
or when normalised:
νΓoptK |α≥ KK−1
=
2(K − 1)K
3(2K − 1)2
(
1
α + 1
)3
. (2.18)
Again, we see that the term (1/α+ 1)3 is correct, but there is an error in the coefficient. Thus, in
both cases ΓoptK approximates Γ∞ with almost correctly shaped functions of α. In particular, the
formulas show that the approximation converges to Γ∞ as K →∞, as should be the case.
If the equidistant partition is not optimal, the optimal partition points δoptk deviate from the
equidistant values δequik . Before completing the analysis, we expected that δ
opt
k < δ
equi
k and δ
opt
k >
δequik can both occur. However, this is not the case, as explained in the next corollary.
Corollary 9. For K ∈ N≥1 the optimal partition for the DMU-1 problem satisfies δopt0 = 0,
δoptK = 1, and
δequik =
k
K ≤ δoptk < K+k−12K−1 for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}.
Proof. For α < K/(K−1) this is trivial as the optimal partition is equidistant. For α ≥ K/(K−1)
we have
δoptk =
K+k−1
2K−1 − K−k2K−1 1α ∈
[
k
K ,
K+k−1
2K−1
)
.
Combining these properties gives the desired result.
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Thus, Corollary 9 shows that the optimal partition points δoptk always deviate to the right (larger
values). A possible explanation is that for α ≥ K/(K−1) we have k∗ = 2 for the optimal partition.
In other words, one contract instigates no trade: (x1, z1) = (0, 0). If α increases we have observed
before that k∗ increases for the equidistant partition. Since k∗ > 2 is suboptimal by Lemma 6, we
must have δopt1 > δ
equi
1 in order to prevent k
∗ > 2. Given δopt1 , the remaining subinterval [δ
opt
1 , 1] is
partitioned equidistantly to obtain δoptk for k = 2, . . . ,K − 1. Thus, since δopt1 > δequi1 we also get
δoptk > δ
equi
k for k = 2, . . . ,K − 1.
Figure 1a shows the optimal partition for K = 2 in terms of α. The two curves are δopt1 in
red and (α − 1)/α in black. Left of α = 2 (the dotted line) the optimal partition satisfies k∗ = 1
and all contracts instigate trade. Right of α = 2 there is no trade with the most inefficient types
p ∈ [
¯
p,
¯
pk∗). The transition in formulas of δ
opt
1 is continuous at the breakpoint α = 2. Furthermore,
this transition occurs exactly when the equidistant partition switches from k∗ = 1 to k∗ = 2, i.e.,
when δequi1 = (α− 1)/α, as seen in the proof of Theorem 8.
The optimal partition for K = 5 is illustrated in Figure 1b. For α ≥ 5/4, notice that as α
increases, the seller refuses the 20% most inefficient (lowest) types p which rapidly increases to
45%, with 55% as limit.
To conclude, we have determined the optimal partition for DMU-1 and all relevant values can
again be expressed in terms of α. Therefore, we can compare the performance of the equidistant
and optimal partitions, which is the topic of the next section.
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(a) For K = 2 contracts. (b) For K = 5 contracts.
Figure 1: DMU-1: optimal partition ∆opt in terms of α.
2.5.2 Performance of partition schemes
We compare two partition schemes: the equidistant partition ∆equi and the optimal partition ∆opt.
As mentioned in Section 2.4.2 the main performance measure of interest is the pooling performance
ΓK/Γ∞. For the DMU-1 problem, Γ∞ is given by (2.16) and (2.17). For the equidistant partition,
we have
νΓequiK =
1
K
K∑
k=k∗
(
1
α +
2k−1
K − 1
)2
,
where k∗ = max
{
1,
⌊
1 + 12
(
1 +K
(
1− 1α
))⌋}
. This allows us to express ΓequiK /Γ∞ in terms of
α. For 0 < α < K/(K − 1) the optimal partition is equal to the equidistant partition, but for
α ≥ K/(K − 1) we have (2.18) and the pooling performance
ΓoptK
Γ∞
|
α≥ KK−1
=
4(K − 1)K
(2K − 1)2 = 1−
1
(2K − 1)2 .
Notice that this pooling performance is constant with respect to α ≥ K/(K − 1). Figure 2 shows
the pooling performance for K ∈ {1, 2, 3} for the equidistant and optimal partitions. By inspection
of the graphs, we conclude that the infimum of ΓequiK /Γ∞ is reached for α→∞ and the infimum of
ΓoptK /Γ∞ is attained for each α ≥ K/(K− 1). We have limα→∞ ΓequiK /Γ∞ = 1− 1/K2. This implies
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that the following lower bounds are tight:
ΓequiK
Γ∞
≥ 1− 1
K2
and
ΓoptK
Γ∞
≥ 1− 1
(2K − 1)2 .
For several values of K, the performance guarantees are listed in Table 1.
We observe that Γ1/Γ∞ → 0 as α → ∞, i.e., offering a single robustly pooled contract can
perform arbitrarily bad compared to offering infinitely many contracts. However, offering two
contracts with the equidistant partition always achieves at least 75% of the maximum obtainable
expected utility. For the optimal partition this is 88%. The reason is as follows. A large α can
be interpreted as having a large uncertainty of the buyer’s efficiency, i.e., a large interval [
¯
p, p¯]. In
order to obtain a high expected utility, the seller wants to offer different contracts to inefficient and
efficient types. This is why for k∗ > 1 the seller refuses to trade with the most inefficient types
(with p ∈ [
¯
p,
¯
pk∗)). For K = 1, a single contract, the seller cannot make a distinction between
efficient and inefficient types and always instigates trade with the buyer (k∗ = 1). In contrast, for
K ≥ 2 the seller can refuse inefficient types (k∗ > 1 for α large enough).
Thus, it is essential for the seller to be able to refuse the most inefficient types when there is
a high uncertainty in the buyer’s efficiency. This is especially noticeable for the optimal partition:
for α large enough (such that k∗ = 2) inefficient types are refused, resulting in a constant pooling
performance onwards.
Finally, notice that the optimal partition greatly outperforms the equidistant partition for large
values of α. In particular, Table 1 shows that the seller can achieve the same performance guarantee
with far fewer contracts when using the optimal partition. For example, for a guarantee of 96%
the seller has to offer 3 contracts with the optimal partition and 5 contracts with the equidistant
partition. For either partition, good performances can be achieved with only a few contracts, which
validates the robust pooling approach.
Wong (2014) restricts his analysis to instances with α ≥ K/(K − 1) (such that k∗ = 2) and
determines the corresponding optimal partition and its pooling performance. Thus, our results
extend and complete the analysis of DMU-1. In particular, by considering all possible instances,
we observe the remarkable optimality of the equidistant partition for each α < K/(K − 1).
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Figure 2: DMU-1: the pooling performance ΓK/Γ∞ for the equidistant and optimal partitions as
functions of the instance parameter α.
Equidistant Optimal
K LB LB
1 0 0
2 0.7500 0.8888
3 0.8888 0.9600
4 0.9375 0.9795
5 0.9600 0.9876
6 0.9722 0.9917
∞ 1 1
Table 1: DMU-1: lower bounds for the pooling performance ΓK/Γ∞ for the equidistant and optimal
partitions.
2.6 Application to the DMU-2 problem
To illustrate the special structure of the DMU-1 problem, we perform a similar analysis for the
DMU-2 problem (n = 2). The buyer has a quadratically decreasing marginal utility for the prod-
ucts. Hence, for 0 < x < 1 the marginal utility is higher than for the DMU-1 problem, but lower
for x > 1. In Section 2.6.1 we show the complexity of finding closed-form formulas for the optimal
partition. However, we can optimise the partition using numerical methods. In Section 2.6.2 we
determine the performance of the equidistant and optimised partitions. Keep in mind that all
values shown with four digits are truncated or rounded.
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2.6.1 Optimal partition
For the DMU-2 problem, the normalised optimal objective value is given by
νΓK =
K∑
k=k∗
(δk − δk−1)
(
1
α + δk + δk−1 − 1
) 3
2 ,
where k∗ = min{k ∈ K : δk +δk−1 > α−1α }. Again, we know by Lemma 6 that the optimal partition
must be strictly ordered and must satisfy k∗ ∈ {1, 2}. In Lemma 10 we determine the optimal
partition for K = 2 contracts.
Lemma 10. For the DMU-2 problem and K = 2, the optimal partition is
δopt1 =

1
30
(√
36 1
α2
− 15 + 15− 6 1α
)
if α < αtrans
1− 25( 1α + 1) if α ≥ αtrans
,
where αtrans ≈ 1.5371. Furthermore, δopt1 satisfies the tight bounds 0.3397 < δopt1 < 35 . Hence, for
α < αtrans all contracts instigate trade (k∗ = 1). For α ≥ αtrans a single contract instigates no
trade (k∗ = 2).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 8, we condition on k∗ being 1 or 2. However, determining
the global maximum is more difficult. We refer to Appendix A.4 for the details.
In Figure 3a the δopt1 for K = 2 is shown in red. Left of α
trans (the dotted line) we have k∗ = 1
and on the right k∗ = 2. As detailed in the proof, the difficulty of determining δopt1 is the existence
of two local maxima, denoted by δ+1 and δ
∗
1 . As shown, the optimal partition jumps discontinuously
from δ+1 to δ
∗
1 at α
trans. Figure 3a illustrates this jump and the coexistence of the local maxima δ+1
(shown in cyan) and δ∗1 (in blue) for α ∈ [3/2, 2/5
√
15]. Comparing this figure with Figure 1a, it is
clear that the properties of the optimal partition for DMU-1 are indeed exceptional.
Lemma 10 shows that the equidistant partition is never optimal for the DMU-2 problem (except
in the limit α → 0). Furthermore, as α increases, the optimal partition point first decreases, then
jumps to a lower value, and finally increases. Thus, if the uncertainty in the buyer’s efficiency is
large enough the optimal menu refuses trade with the most inefficient types. Moreover, as this
uncertainty increases, trade is refused for more types, as is the case for the DMU-1 problem.
For a general number of contracts K, we can attempt to imitate the proof of Lemma 10.
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However, this requires to solve a complicated non-linear system of equalities, for which a general
solution seems impossible. Instead, we optimise the partition numerically using the gradient-
based methodology described in Appendix A.5. Although the used solver can only guarantee local
optimality, its performance is stable and the results correspond to our theoretical results when
available. Therefore, all results indicate that the method finds the global optimum.
We see a similar structure in the optimised partition for K ≥ 2 as observed for the optimal
partition for K = 2: decreasing in α at first, then a discontinuous jump to a lower value, and finally
increasing in α. See Figure 3b for the optimised partition for K = 5. Notice that the optimised
partition points are not bounded by the equidistant partition points, as is the case for DMU-1.
To conclude, this analysis for the DMU-2 shows the special structure of the DMU-1, for which
the equidistant partition can be optimal and general formulas can be determined. For the DMU-
2 problem, we can numerically optimise the partition for any number of contracts. In the next
section, we compare the performance of the equidistant and optimised partitions.
(a) Optimal partition δopt1 for K = 2 contracts. (b) Optimised partition for K = 5 contracts.
Figure 3: DMU-2: optimised partition in terms of α.
2.6.2 Performance of partition schemes
As in Section 2.5.2, we compare the pooling performance ΓK/Γ∞ for the equidistant and optimised
partitions. Recall that the related formulas for Γ∞ and Γ
equi
K are (2.13), (2.14), and (2.15). As
explained in the previous section, we only have numerical results for the optimised partition.
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Figure 4 shows the pooling performance for K ∈ {1, 2, 3} for the equidistant and optimised
partitions. First of all, Γ1/Γ∞ is not shown completely, because it goes to zero for α→∞ as seen
for the DMU-1 problem. In contrast to DMU-1, the performance of the equidistant partition has
local minima and maxima, and the infimum is typically attained at some finite value for α (so not
for α → ∞). Furthermore, for a fixed instance, an equidistant (K + 1)-partition does not always
perform better than an equidistant K-partition. For example, for α = 20 the equidistant 4-partition
outperforms the equidistant 5-partition. The lower bounds on the pooling performance are given
in Table 2. Note that the lower bounds for the equidistant partition with 4 and 5 contracts are
effectively the same.
For α such that k∗ = 2 for the optimised partition, we see that the pooling performance is
constant and minimal. For K = 2 this can be verified with Lemma 10. This property also holds
for DMU-1. Table 2 also includes the lower bounds for the optimised partition.
To conclude, as for the DMU-1 problem, offering a single robust contract is not recommended.
However, by offering only a few contracts, high pooling performance can be achieved of at least
88% (equidistant partition) or 92% (optimised partition). The partition can be optimised using
numerical methods, which is in particular beneficial for up to five contracts.
Figure 4: DMU-2: the pooling performance ΓK/Γ∞ for the equidistant and optimised partitions
as functions of the instance parameter α.
32
Econometric Institute Report EI2017-10
Equidistant Optimised
K LB LB
1 0 0
2 0.8838 0.9295
3 0.9065 0.9763
4 0.9681 0.9882
5 0.9681 0.9929
6 0.9842 0.9953
∞ 1 1
Table 2: DMU-2: lower bounds for the pooling performance ΓK/Γ∞ for the equidistant and opti-
mised partitions.
3 Contracting for minimising costs
In this section we analyse the robust pooling model in the setting of cost minimisation using the
same approach as in Section 2. We formalise the model in Section 3.1. Although the models for
maximising utility and for minimising cost have a similar structure, they are not equivalent under
the considered assumptions. Nevertheless, the general analysis is similar and will be provided in
Appendix B.1. When needed, we will highlight the differences between cost minimisation and
utility maximisation. We apply the robust pooling model to a classical cost minimisation model
based on the Economic Order Quantity setting in Section 3.2.
3.1 The model
As in Section 2, the principal is a seller of products and the agent a buyer. The seller offers contracts
to the buyer, which specify the order quantity x ∈ R≥0 and a side payment z ∈ R. In contrast to
utility maximisation, here we define z to be the side payment from the seller to the buyer to be
consistent with the literature related to the model considered in Section 3.2.
As before, we assume that the buyer’s private information can be captured by a parameter
p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] ⊆ R≥0 with p¯ >
¯
p. The buyer’s cost for order quantity x is φB(x|p) and the corresponding
seller’s cost is φS(x). The seller applies the same robust pooling approach as before. First, the seller
decides how many contracts are offered, denoted by K ∈ N≥1. Second, he divides the interval [
¯
p, p¯]
into K subintervals, using a proper K-partition. Third, the seller designs a menu of K contracts
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by solving the following optimisation model:
min
x,z
∑
k∈K
ωk (φS(xk) + zk) ,
s.t. φB(xk|pk)− zk ≤ Θ, ∀ pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k], k ∈ K, (3.1)
φB(xk|pk)− zk ≤ φB(xl|pk)− zl, ∀ pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k], k, l ∈ K, (3.2)
xk ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ K.
Except for (3.1), the model is essentially the same as in Section 2.4. Constraints (3.1) ensure
individual rationality for the buyer, which need further clarification. The parameter Θ ∈ R≥0 is
the buyer’s reservation level: if the buyer’s net cost for a contract would exceed Θ he will not accept
it. In the literature, Θ is often the cost for ordering at an outside option. Hence, Θ is also called
the outside option or default option.
For utility maximisation problems, such as the DMU-n problem in Section 2.4, it is common
that the default option is to have no trade and thus zero utility. This implies Θ = 0. Therefore,
we did not include Θ in the model description in Section 2. For cost minimisation problems this is
not the case, as there is no common natural default option. For example, if the default option is to
have no trade, which (virtual) cost should be assigned? If the default is to use an outside option,
does the corresponding cost depend on [
¯
p, p¯] or not? For the problem analysed in Section 3.2, and
its default option, it is useful to mention Θ explicitly in the model as it effects the results.
To prepare for Section 3.2, we make the following assumption on the buyer’s cost function to
derive a simpler reformulation of the robust pooling model.
Assumption 5. The buyer’s cost function is φB(x|p) = ψ(x) + pχ(x), where the functions ψ :
R≥0 → R and χ : R≥0 → R≥0 do not depend on the type p. Moreover, χ is non-decreasing and
non-negative.
Although we can rewrite the cost minimisation problem into a utility maximisation problem,
Assumption 5 does not fit into the framework of Section 2, because of the resulting negative term
−pχ(x) in the buyer’s utility function.
Under Assumption 5, we can derive results equivalent to those in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, which
are given in Appendix B.1. The proofs and results are essentially identical, with the following
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highlighted exceptions. First, the change of variables by redefining the side payment includes the
outside option Θ:
zk = ψ(xk) + yk −Θ.
Consequently, Θ appears as a constant in the objective function of the reformulated models.
Second, the structure of the optimal side payments and the feasible region is ‘reversed’ in terms
of the contract indices k. For example, the feasible region is x1 ≥ · · · ≥ xK ≥ 0. However, in terms
of buyer type’s efficiency the result is not reversed. Here, a buyer with a lower parameter p is more
efficient, since he has lower costs for an order quantity.
Finally, under Assumption 5 the robust pooling model is equivalent to the limited variety and
discrete models. For the discrete model, the highest type p¯k must be chosen as representative for
[
¯
pk, p¯k], i.e., again the most inefficient type. This can be shown using a similar argument as in
Section 2.3.
We continue to apply robust pooling and these results to the Economic Order Quantity model
in the next section.
3.2 Economic order quantity problem
We consider a contracting model to which we can apply the robust pooling setting of Section 3.1.
The considered cost functions are those of the classical Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) model,
which model the average cost of a trade agreement over an infinite horizon. The context of the
problem is as follows.
The buyer has external demand with constant rate d ∈ R>0 on an infinite time horizon, which
must be satisfied without backlogging. He can order products at the seller, which has an ordering
cost of f ∈ R>0 for the buyer. Furthermore, the buyer has an inventory holding cost of h ∈ R>0
per product and time unit. The buyer’s holding cost h is the private parameter. To minimise his
own costs, the buyer orders if and only if his inventory is depleted (the zero-inventory property).
Therefore, an order quantity of x ∈ R>0 products leads to a total cost per time unit of φB(x) =
df 1x +
1
2hx.
The seller has a similar cost structure: setup cost F ∈ R>0 and inventory holding cost H ∈ R>0.
Production takes place with constant rate p ∈ R>d and according to a just-in-time lot-for-lot policy.
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This leads to a total costs per time unit for the seller of φS(x) = dF
1
x +
1
2H
d
px.
To simplify notation, we define R = dF , P = 12H
d
p , r = df , and p =
1
2h. Hence, the buyer’s
cost function is
φB(x|p) = r 1x + px,
where r ∈ R>0 is a fixed parameter and p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] ⊆ R≥0 the buyer’s private parameter. We assume
that the distribution of p is uniform. Likewise, the seller’s costs are given by φS(x) = R
1
x +Px for
fixed parameters R,P ∈ R>0.
Given this setting, the seller constructs a menu of contracts using the robust pooling approach
of Section 3.1. We refer to this problem as the Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) problem, which
is analysed in detail in the following sections. In Section 3.2.1, we determine the optimal solution
and corresponding optimal objective value. Section 3.2.2 focuses on performance measures. We
show that performance measures can be expressed in terms of an instance parameter α, similar
to the DMU-n problem. In Section 3.2.3, we analyse the optimal partition for the EOQ problem.
Finally, the derived results are used in Section 3.2.4 to determine the performance of the equidistant
partition and the optimised partition.
3.2.1 Optimal solution and objective value
Since the EOQ setting satisfies the assumptions of Appendix B.1, we can apply the results of this
appendix. In particular, we obtain the optimal solution of the EOQ problem as a corollary, see
Corollary 11.
Corollary 11. For given K ∈ N≥1 and proper K-partition of [
¯
p, p¯], the optimal solution for the
EOQ problem is given by
xk =
√
R+ r
P −
¯
p+ p¯k +
¯
pk
and zk = r
1
xk
+ p¯kxk +
K∑
i=k+1
(p¯i −
¯
pi)xi −Θ.
Hence, x1 > · · · > xK > 0 and trade always occurs.
The corresponding optimal objective value ΓK is
ΓK = 2
√
R+ r
K∑
k=1
p¯k −
¯
pk
p¯−
¯
p
√
P −
¯
p+ p¯k +
¯
pk −Θ. (3.3)
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Proof. We apply Theorem 17 stated in Appendix B.1 to the EOQ problem. Since φS(x) + ψ(x) =
(R+r) 1x +Px it is straightforward to determine that k
∗ = K and kˆ = 1 (note that the definitions of
k∗ and kˆ differ from Section 2). The results now follow directly from the theorem after simplifying
the expressions.
Recall that for the DMU-n problem the optimal menu could include contracts that instigated
no trade (xk = 0 for some k ∈ K). By Corollary 11 trade always occurs for the EOQ problem
(xk > 0 for all k ∈ K).
As in Section 2.4 there are two extreme choices for K, namely K = 1 and K =∞. The optimal
objective value Γ1 is the highest expected cost for the seller when using robust pooling:
Γ1 = 2
√
R+ r
√
P + p¯−Θ.
In contrast, Γ∞ is the lowest expected cost for the seller:
Γ∞ = 2
√
R+ r
p¯−
¯
p
∫ p¯
¯
p
√
P −
¯
p+ 2p dp−Θ
=
2
3
√
R+ r
p¯−
¯
p
((
P + 2p¯−
¯
p
)3
2 − (P +
¯
p
)3
2
)
−Θ.
Again, we recognise that ΓK is the composite midpoint rule for numerical integration applied to
the integrand of Γ∞.
3.2.2 Performance measures
We redefine the partition into terms of δ as in Section 2.4:
¯
pk =
¯
p+ δk−1(p¯−
¯
p) and p¯k =
¯
p+ δk(p¯−
¯
p),
where δ0 = 0, δk ∈ [0, 1] for k = 1, . . . ,K − 1, and δK = 1. Thus, (3.3) becomes
ΓK = 2
√
R+ r
K∑
k=1
(δk − δk−1)
√
P +
¯
p+ (δk + δk−1)(p¯−
¯
p)−Θ. (3.4)
We introduce the same instance parameter α ∈ R>0 as for the DMU-n problem:
α =
p¯−
¯
p
P +
¯
p
,
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but a different normalisation factor ν:
ν =
(
2
√
R+ r
√
p¯−
¯
p
)−1
.
Consequently, the normalised optimal objective values are given by
νΓK =
K∑
k=1
(δk − δk−1)
√
1
α + δk + δk−1 − Θν , (3.5)
νΓ∞ = 13
((
1
α + 2
)3
2 − ( 1α)32)− Θν . (3.6)
For performance measures that use differences, such as (Γ1−ΓK)/(Γ1−Γ∞), the outside option
Θ cancels out. Therefore, these performance indicators are 1-dimensional functions in terms of α.
However, the relative improvement (Γ1 − ΓK)/Γ1, for example, is more difficult to analyse, since
Θ/ν is in the denominator.
For other EOQ contracting problems in the literature it is common to assume that by default the
buyer places orders using his own individually optimal order quantity. Hence, Θ is the corresponding
minimal cost for the buyer. This worst-case assumption fits the conservative approach of robust
pooling. In terms of the robust pooling model, this assumption leads to
Θ∗ = inf
p∈[
¯
p,p¯]
inf
x≥0
φB(x|p) = 2√r
¯
p, (3.7)
which implies that
Θ∗
ν =
√
r
R+ r
√
¯
p
p¯−
¯
p
.
From this point onwards, we assume that the outside option Θ is set according to (3.7).
When determining performance bounds, we take supremum or infimum of the performance
measure with respect to all possible instances. This often means that Θ∗/ν must be as large or as
small as possible. For example, consider (Γ1 − ΓK)/Γ1. For fixed α > 0, we want that Θ∗/ν is as
small (large) as possible for the infimum (supremum). Now notice that any fixed α can be attained
for any R > 0 and P > 0 by using the parameters
¯
p and p¯. Thus, the infimum can be reached for
R→∞, for which
lim
R→∞
Θ∗
ν = 0.
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Likewise, the supremum can be reached for R→ 0 and P → 0, which implies that
lim
P→0
lim
R→0
Θ∗
ν = limP→0
√
1
α
− P
p¯−
¯
p
=
1√
α
.
To conclude, when assuming (3.7) the bounds for (Γ1 − ΓK)/Γ1 and similar performance mea-
sures can still be determined by a 1-dimensional function of α.
3.2.3 Optimal partition
As is the case for the DMU-2 problem, a general formula for the optimal partition for the EOQ prob-
lem seems impossible. We do note that the optimal partition only depends on α and in particular
not on Θ. Furthermore, the optimal partition must be a proper K-partition, see Lemma 12.
Lemma 12. For any K ∈ N≥1 an optimal partition ∆ must satisfy 0 = δ0 < δ1 < · · · < δK−1 <
δK = 1.
Proof. The proof mimics that of Lemma 6, but is simpler due to the lack of k∗. We can simply
take  = 1/2 in both cases in the proof and use the strict concavity of the square root function on
R≥0. See Appendix B.2 for the details.
We show the difficulty of finding formulas for the optimal partition by deriving the optimal
partition for K = 2, see Lemma 13.
Lemma 13. For the EOQ problem and K = 2, the optimal partition is
δopt1 =
1
6α
(
√
α2 + 8α+ 4 + α− 2),
which satisfies the tight bounds 13 < δ1 <
1
2 .
Proof. We set the derivative of Γ2 to zero and verify that the resulting partition is the global
minimum. The details are in Appendix B.2.
For a general number of contracts, we need to solve a complicated non-linear system of equalities.
However, a numerical approach is viable. We apply a similar methodology as in Section 2.6.1. Notice
that we do not need to account for k∗, which simplifies the procedure. See Figure 5a for the optimal
partition δopt1 for K = 2 and Figure 5b for the optimised partition for K = 5.
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Both Lemma 13 for K = 2 and the numerical results for K ≥ 2 show that δoptk ≤ δequik . This is
also the case for DMU-1, but not DMU-2. Thus, whether δoptk is bounded by δ
equi
k seems to be a
problem-specific property.
To conclude, by using a numerical solution approach, we can determine optimised partitions
for the EOQ problem. We continue by determining the pooling performance of the equidistant and
optimised partitions.
(a) Optimal partition δopt1 for K = 2 contracts. (b) Optimised partition for K = 5 contracts.
Figure 5: EOQ: optimised partition in terms of α.
3.2.4 Performance of partition schemes
In Section 3.2.4 we have shown that the infimum and supremum of relative performance measures
can still be expressed as 1-dimensional functions of α. In particular, the pooling performance is
calculated by rewriting ΓK/Γ∞ into 1 + (ΓK − Γ∞)/Γ∞. Thus, for upper bounds on the pooling
performance, we use formulas (3.5) and (3.6) with Θ∗/ν = α−1/2.
The results are shown in Figure 6 and Table 3. The performances for the equidistant and
optimised partitions have roughly the same shape as Γ1/Γ∞, i.e., there is a global maximum for a
finite α and a (lower) asymptote for α→∞.
Compared to the results of Section 2.4, the dominant difference is that a single robust contract
performs reasonably well with a pooling performance of 107%. It is not arbitrarily bad as is the
case for the DMU-n problem. We believe the reason is twofold. First, when minimising costs, there
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is a natural lowest cost possible. In contrast, when maximising utility without budgets, there is no
natural limitation. Second, the EOQ cost functions are known for being relatively insensitive to
small perturbations in the order quantity or the cost parameters.
From the results, we see that the optimised partition performs only marginally better than the
equidistant partition. For example, for K = 2 the absolute difference in pooling performance is
about 0.4%.
We conclude that robust pooling obtains exceptionally good performances for the EOQ problem.
Offering a single robust contract is viable, but it is recommended to offer a few more contracts for
a better performance guarantee.
Figure 6: EOQ: pooling performance ΓK/Γ∞ for the equidistant and optimised partitions as func-
tions of the instance parameter α.
Equidistant Optimised
K UB UB
1 1.0667 1.0667
2 1.0259 1.0218
3 1.0147 1.0108
4 1.0098 1.0065
5 1.0071 1.0043
6 1.0055 1.0031
∞ 1 1
Table 3: EOQ: upper bounds for the pooling performance ΓK/Γ∞ for the equidistant and optimised
partitions.
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4 Conclusion
We have presented and analysed a new modelling approach for principal-agent contracting models,
called robust pooling. This approach considers a buyer whose type follows a continuous distribution
on the interval [
¯
p, p¯] ⊆ R. The seller wants to offer a menu with a finite number of contracts
K ∈ N≥1. In our approach, the seller partitions [
¯
p, p¯] into K subintervals and designs a menu with
a single contract for each subinterval. The menu is constructed such that each type will choose its
intended contract, making the menu robust to the buyer’s private information.
With the robust pooling modelling approach we can compare offering different number of con-
tracts in a natural and consistent way. Furthermore, we can determine performance guarantees in
terms of the number of contracts offered, provided that the problem can be analysed (analytically or
numerically) in sufficient detail. The existing classical continuous and discrete approaches are not
suitable for this analysis. The continuous approach does not handle offering finitely many contracts.
For the discrete approach such analysis requires changing the distribution of the buyer’s type. This
makes any comparison inconsistent, already from a modelling point of view. An exception is when
the discrete model turns out to be robust, i.e., when the representative of each subinterval is its
most inefficient type and the representatives have suitable probabilities. However, this robustness
is not apparent from the discrete model, but follows from our robust pooling analysis.
Compared to the limited variety approach from the literature, we restrict the pooling of types
to use a partition of [
¯
p, p¯]. We make this restriction to structure the buyer’s choice, to obtain simple
and intuitive mechanisms, to guarantee the accuracy of the extracted information on the buyer’s
type, and to promote the experimentation with partition schemes. For example, the seller can use
the equidistant partition as a simple heuristic. After observing the buyer’s chosen contract, the
seller can narrow down the buyer’s type to the corresponding subinterval. Thus, the accuracy of the
extracted information is related to the width of the subintervals and is straightforwardly controlled
by the seller by varying the number of contracts.
In Section 2 we have applied robust pooling to utility maximisation problems and in Section 3
to cost minimisation problems. The robust pooling model can be reformulated and simplified under
certain assumptions on the buyer’s utility/cost function, which are not uncommon in the literature.
In particular, we have analysed two problems in detail: the DMU-n problem, based on a decreasing
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marginal utility, and the EOQ problem, based on the economic order quantity setting.
Our application of robust pooling to these two problems leads to new insights into the perfor-
mances of partition schemes of [
¯
p, p¯]. A natural choice is to partition [
¯
p, p¯] equidistantly. For the
DMU-1 problem, the equidistant partition is optimal for a fully specified family of instances, but
is suboptimal for other instances. The optimality seems to be a special property of DMU-1, since
it is suboptimal for the DMU-2 and EOQ problems.
It is difficult to say whether the equidistant partition performs good enough for a given number
of contracts. This depends on what performance is acceptable. Naturally, the performance of the
equidistant partition reaches that of the optimal partition as the number of contracts increases.
However, the idea for robust pooling is to offer only a few contracts. For the DMU-1 problem, it
is definitely worthwhile to optimise the partition when using up to five contracts. For example,
offering 3 contracts with the optimal partition achieves at least 96% of the best possible expected
utility (corresponding to infinitely many contracts). For the equidistant partition this is 88%. For
the DMU-2 and EOQ problems the difference in performance is smaller. In fact, for the EOQ
problem the equidistant partition performs exceptionally well.
Overall, we conclude that robust pooling with only a few contracts, say 3 to 5, leads to high
performances and is a viable approach. Offering only a single contract is not advised, since being
able to distinguish between inefficient and efficient types is needed for good performances. For
example, the optimal menu for the DMU-n problem refuses trade with the most inefficient types
in certain cases. Offering a single contract can lead to arbitrarily bad performance for the DMU-n
problem.
A possible extension to our analysis is to consider partition heuristics. Based on the results
of DMU-1 and DMU-2, we can design the following partition heuristic: optimise only the first
partition point and partition the remaining subinterval equidistantly. This is in fact optimal for
DMU-1. However, numerically optimising the entire partition is relatively straightforward. Thus,
such heuristics should have a clear benefit to (numerically) optimising the entire partition. For
example, a heuristic should follow a rule of thumb and not require numerical optimisation.
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A Addendum to Section 2
A.1 Proofs for Section 2.2
Proof of Lemma 1. Let x be feasible, i.e., there exists an y such that (x, y) is a feasible solution.
The proof consists of two parts: first we show that (2.7) holds for contract k = 1, then we focus on
the other contracts in the menu (k > 1).
First, realise that for an optimal y at least one IR constraint (2.5) must hold with equality. If
this is not the case, we can increase all yk by adding some  > 0 until at least one IR constraint
is tight. This new solution is still feasible, as (2.6) only considers the difference yk − yl, which is
unaffected. Moreover, the objective value of the new solution is strictly larger.
Now, suppose that y1 <
¯
p1χ(x1), then for k ∈ K we have for all pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k] that
pkχ(xk)− yk ≥
¯
pkχ(xk)− yk
(2.6)
≥
¯
pkχ(x1)− y1 ≥
¯
p1χ(x1)− y1 > 0.
Here, we use that χ is non-negative. The result implies that no IR constraint is tight, which is
suboptimal as argued above. Hence, for an optimal y it must hold that y1 =
¯
p1χ(x1).
Second, fix k ∈ K with k > 1 and consider the following IC constraints between contracts k and
k − 1:
p¯k−1(χ(xk)− χ(xk−1)) ≤ yk − yk−1 ≤
¯
pk(χ(xk)− χ(xk−1)).
Since p¯k−1 =
¯
pk, this implies that
yk − yk−1 =
¯
pk(χ(xk)− χ(xk−1)).
Using our earlier result that y1 =
¯
p1χ(x1), we obtain the following formula:
yk =
k∑
i=2 ¯
pi(χ(xi)− χ(xi−1)) +
¯
p1χ(x1),
which can be rewritten into (2.7).
Proof of Lemma 2. First, we show the necessity of x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xK . Let k, k + 1 ∈ K and consider
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(2.6) for
¯
pk and
¯
pk+1:
¯
pkχ(xk)− yk ≥
¯
pkχ(xk+1)− yk+1 and
¯
pk+1χ(xk+1)− yk+1 ≥
¯
pk+1χ(xk)− yk.
Adding both IC constraints leads to (
¯
pk−
¯
pk+1)(χ(xk)−χ(xk+1)) ≥ 0. Since
¯
pk <
¯
pk+1, this implies
that χ(xk) ≤ χ(xk+1) and xk ≤ xk+1 since χ is non-decreasing.
Second, we show sufficiency of 0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xK . Let x ≥ 0 be non-decreasing and set y
according to (2.7). Since χ is non-decreasing, we have χ(xk) ≤ χ(xk+1) for k ∈ K. It remains to
check feasibility of (x, y). Fix k ∈ K and pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k]. For l ∈ K with k < l we have
yk − yl =
l−1∑
i=k
(yi − yi+1) (2.7)=
l−1∑
i=k ¯
pi+1(χ(xi)− χ(xi+1))
≤
l−1∑
i=k
p¯k(χ(xi)− χ(xi+1)) = p¯k(χ(xk)− χ(xl)) ≤ pk(χ(xk)− χ(xl)).
Likewise, let l ∈ K with l < k, then
yk − yl =
k∑
i=l+1
(yi − yi−1) (2.7)=
k∑
i=l+1¯
pi(χ(xi)− χ(xi−1))
≤
k∑
i=l+1¯
pk(χ(xi)− χ(xi−1)) =
¯
pk(χ(xk)− χ(xl)) ≤ pk(χ(xk)− χ(xl)).
Hence, all IC constraints (2.6) hold. Furthermore,
pkχ(xk)− yk ≥
¯
pkχ(xk)− yk
(2.6)
≥
¯
pkχ(x1)− y1 ≥
¯
p1χ(x1)− y1 = 0.
Thus, all IR constraints (2.5) are satisfied and the solution is feasible.
Proof of Theorem 4. The uniform distribution (Assumption 4) implies that ωk = (p¯k−
¯
pk)/(p¯−
¯
p).
Therefore, we can simplify the summation in (2.8) as follows:
(p¯k −
¯
pk)
K∑
i=k+1
ωi
ωk
=
K∑
i=k+1
(p¯i −
¯
pi) = p¯− p¯k.
Substituting these expressions in the result of Theorem 3 gives the desired formulation of the
optimisation problem.
For the optimal solution, we first relax the constraint x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xK to obtain a separable
optimisation problem. Since the objective of the relaxed problem is strictly concave and differen-
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tiable (Assumption 3), its optimal solution can easily be determined. Consider contract k ∈ K. We
distinguish three cases.
Case I: if
d
dxk
(φS + ψ)(0) + p¯k +
¯
pk − p¯ ≤ 0,
then it is optimal for the relaxed problem to set xk = 0. Otherwise, the optimal xk for the relaxed
problem satisfies xk > 0.
Case II: if
lim
xk→∞
(
d
dxk
(φS + ψ)(xk) + p¯k +
¯
pk − p¯
)
≥ 0,
then it is optimal to set xk = ∞. Otherwise, a finite x is optimal. Here, we use that the above
limit is zero only if it is an asymptote. This holds since φS +ψ is strictly concave, implying that its
derivative is strictly decreasing. Furthermore, this shows that Cases I and II are indeed mutually
exclusive for (fixed) k.
Case III: if the above cases do not hold the optimal xk is found by setting the derivative to zero:
d
dxk
(
φS(xk) + ψ(xk) + (p¯k +
¯
pk − p¯)xk
)
= 0 ⇐⇒ d
dxk
(φS + ψ)(xk) = −(p¯k +
¯
pk − p¯).
Since φS + ψ is strictly concave and differentiable, its derivative is continuous and invertible.
Furthermore, Cases I and II are excluded, so the following value is well-defined and strictly positive:
xˆk =
(
d
dxk
(φS + ψ)
)−1
(p¯− p¯k −
¯
pk),
which is the optimum for the relaxed problem. Notice that the definitions of k∗ and kˆ imply that
Case III corresponds to k ∈ K such that k∗ ≤ k ≤ kˆ. By strict concavity of φS + ψ we know that
its derivative is strictly decreasing. Furthermore, realise that p¯k +
¯
pk − p¯ < p¯k+1 +
¯
pk+1 − p¯ for all
k ∈ K. Therefore, we have 0 < xˆk∗ < · · · < xˆkˆ.
Combining all cases leads to a solution satisfying 0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xK , which is feasible for the
non-relaxed problem. Hence, this is the optimal solution to our original problem.
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A.2 Proofs for Section 2.4
Proof of Lemma 6. Consider an optimal partition ∆ that does not satisfy the properties stated in
the lemma. First, recall the definition of k∗ = min
{
k ∈ K : δk + δk−1 > α−1α
}
. Suppose k∗(∆) > 2,
which requires K > 2. Construct a new partition ∆ˆ with δˆ1 = δk∗−1, δˆk = δk∗ for 1 < k < k∗ and
δˆk = δk otherwise. By construction, the partition ∆ˆ leads to the same objective value as ∆ and is
therefore an optimal partition. Furthermore, we have
δˆ1 + δˆ0 = δk∗−1 + δ0 ≤ δk∗−1 + δk∗−2 ≤ α−1α
δˆk + δˆk−1 ≥ δk∗ + δk∗−1 > α−1α , for k = 2, . . . ,K.
Thus, k∗(∆ˆ) = 2. Therefore, by applying this transformation, we can assume without loss of
generality that the optimal partition ∆ satisfies k∗(∆) ∈ {1, 2}.
Second, we modify the partition ∆ into a strictly better one, which is a contradiction. The
details require two cases to be analysed.
Case I: there exists an index i ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1} such that δi−1 = δi < δi+1. Notice that
i+ 1 ≥ 2 ≥ k∗(∆) ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, δi+1 + δi > α−1α and there exists an 0 <  < 1 such that
(1− )δi+1 + (1 + )δi > α−1α .
Construct a new partition ∆ˆ by setting δˆi = (1−)δi+1+δi and δˆk = δk otherwise. By construction,
we have δˆi−1 < δˆi < δˆi+1, i ≥ k∗(∆ˆ), and k∗(∆ˆ) ≤ k∗(∆). The normalised objective value
corresponding to ∆ˆ differs from that of ∆ as follows: the terms
i+1∑
k=max{i,k∗(∆)}
(δk − δk−1)
(
1
α + δk + δk−1 − 1
)n+1
n = (δi+1 − δi)
(
1
α + δi+1 + δi − 1
)n+1
n
are replaced by
(δˆi − δˆi−1)
(
1
α + δˆi + δˆi−1 − 1
)n+1
n
+ (δˆi+1 − δˆi)
(
1
α + δˆi+1 + δˆi − 1
)n+1
n
= (1− )(δi+1 − δi)
(
1
α + (1− )δi+1 + (1 + )δi − 1
)n+1
n
+ (δi+1 − δi)
(
1
α + (2− )δi+1 + δi − 1
)n+1
n
> (δi+1 − δi)
(
1
α + δi+1 + δi − 1
)n+1
n .
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The inequality follows from strict convexity of the function (·)n+1n on R≥0. This implies that ∆ˆ is
strictly better than ∆, which contradicts the optimality of ∆.
Case II: δK−1 = δK = 1. Define i = min{k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} : δk = δK} to be the first partition
point that coincides with δK . Notice that δ0 < δi and δi + δi−1 = 1 + δi−1 ≥ 1 > α−1α , so i ≥ k∗(∆).
Therefore, there exists an 0 <  < 1 such that (1− )δi + (1 + )δi−1 > α−1α .
Construct a new partition ∆ˆ by setting δˆi = (1 − )δi + δi−1 and δˆk = δk otherwise. By
construction, we have δˆi−1 < δˆi < δˆi+1 and k∗(∆ˆ) = k∗(∆). The normalised objective value
corresponding to ∆ˆ differs from that of ∆ as follows: the terms
i+1∑
k=max{i,k∗(∆)}
(δk − δk−1)
(
1
α + δk + δk−1 − 1
)n+1
n = (δi − δi−1)
(
1
α + δi + δi−1 − 1
)n+1
n
are replaced by
(δˆi − δˆi−1)
(
1
α + δˆi + δˆi−1 − 1
)n+1
n
+ (δˆi+1 − δˆi)
(
1
α + δˆi+1 + δˆi − 1
)n+1
n
= (1− )(δi − δi−1)
(
1
α + (1− )δi + (1 + )δi−1 − 1
)n+1
n
+ (δi − δi−1)
(
1
α + (2− )δi + δi−1 − 1
)n+1
n
> (δi − δi−1)
(
1
α + δi + δi−1 − 1
)n+1
n .
Hence, ∆ˆ is strictly better than ∆, which contradicts the optimality of ∆. This concludes the
proof.
A.3 Proofs for Section 2.5
Proof of Lemma 8. By Lemma 6 we know that k∗ ∈ {1, 2} for the optimal partition. First, we
analyse the objective function ΓK when we consider k
∗ as a parameter independent of the chosen
partition (which it is not). To simplify notation, we use the normalised νΓK , which does not affect
the optimality of a partition. Suppose k∗ = 1, then the normalised objective function is
νΓK |k∗=1 =
(
(δ1 − δ0)( 1α + δ1 + δ0 − 1)2 + (δ2 − δ1)( 1α + δ2 + δ1 − 1)2
+ (δ3 − δ2)( 1α + δ3 + δ2 − 1)2 + (δ4 − δ3)( 1α + δ4 + δ3 − 1)2 + · · ·
+ (δK−1 − δK−2)( 1α + δK−1 + δK−2 − 1)2
+ (δK − δK−1)( 1α + δK + δK−1 − 1)2
)
.
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Since terms cancel out, this is a quadratic function for each δk, k = 1, . . . ,K − 1. Note that δ0 = 0
and δK = 1 are fixed for any partition. Setting the gradient to zero gives (δk+1 − δk−1)(δk+1 +
δk−1 − 2δk) = 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}. By Lemma 6 we know that δk+1 > δk−1 must hold for
the optimal partition, so the only possibility is δk =
1
2(δk+1 + δk−1) for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}. The
solution to this linear system of equalities is
δk =
k
K
≡ δequik ,
which is the equidistant partition ∆equi.
Likewise, suppose k∗ = 2, then we have
νΓK |k∗=2 =
(
(δ2 − δ1)( 1α + δ2 + δ1 − 1)2
+ (δ3 − δ2)( 1α + δ3 + δ2 − 1)2 + (δ4 − δ3)( 1α + δ4 + δ3 − 1)2 + · · ·
+ (δK−1 − δK−2)( 1α + δK−1 + δK−2 − 1)2
+ (δp− δK−1)( 1α + δK + δK−1 − 1)2
)
.
This is cubic in δ1 and quadratic in the other δk (k ∈ {2, . . . ,K − 1}). Setting the gradient to zero
gives
(1− 1α + δ2 − 3δ1)( 1α − 1 + δ2 + δ1) = 0
and (δk+1 − δk−1)(δk+1 + δk−1 − 2δk) = 0 for k ∈ {2, . . . ,K − 1}. The roots of the derivative of the
cubic function are
δ1 =
1
3(1− 1α + δ2) and δ1 = 1− 1α − δ2.
By closer investigation of the shape of this cubic function, the larger value of these two corresponds
to the maximum. Solving the system of linear equations for both cases results in:
δ1 =
1
3(1− 1α + δ2) =⇒ δk =
K + k − 1
2K − 1 −
K − k
2K − 1
1
α
,
δ1 = 1− 1α − δ2 =⇒ δk =
K + k − 3
2K − 3 −
K − k
2K − 3
1
α
.
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Since δ1 is larger in the first case, this is the correct solution. Hence,
δk =
K + k − 1
2K − 1 −
K − k
2K − 1
1
α
= 1− K − k
2K − 1
(
1
α
+ 1
)
≡ δcubick .
We refer to this partition as ∆cubic.
Finally, we check which of these partitions is feasible. First, we check correctness with k∗. We
have (∆equi ⇒ k∗ = 1) if and only if δequi1 > α−1α , which is 1K > α−1α or equivalently α < KK−1 .
Likewise, (∆cubic ⇒ k∗ = 2) if and only if δcubic1 ≤ α−1α and δcubic2 + δcubic1 > α−1α . These conditions
require the following:
δcubic1 ≤ α−1α ⇐⇒ 1− K−12K−1
(
1
α + 1
) ≤ α−1α ⇐⇒ α ≥ KK−1 ,
δcubic2 + δ
cubic
1 >
α−1
α ⇐⇒ 2− 2K−32K−1
(
1
α + 1
)
> α−1α ⇐⇒ α > −1.
Moreover, we need to check δcubic1 > δ0 = 0:
δcubic1 > 0 ⇐⇒ 1− K−12K−1
(
1
α + 1
)
> 0 ⇐⇒ α > K−1K .
This condition is trivially satisfied for the range α ≥ KK−1 corresponding to ∆cubic.
To conclude, for α < K/(K − 1) the optimal partition is ∆equi, whereas for α ≥ K/(K − 1) the
optimal partition is ∆cubic.
A.4 Proofs for Section 2.6
Proof of Lemma 10. First, we consider k∗ = 1, for which
νΓ2 = δ1
(
1
α + δ1 − 1
) 3
2 + (1− δ1)
(
1
α + δ1
) 3
2 .
Setting the derivative with respect to δ1 to zero and solving the equation for δ1 results in two
solutions:
δ+1 =
1
30
(√
36 1
α2
− 15 + 15− 6 1α
)
and δ−1 =
1
30
(
−
√
36 1
α2
− 15 + 15− 6 1α
)
.
The partition point δ+1 is a local maximum, whereas δ
−
1 does not maximise the objective. Further-
more, δ+1 is valid for α ∈ (0, 25
√
15], i.e., it is feasible and corresponds to k∗ = 1.
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Second, consider k∗ = 2, where the normalised optimal objective is
νΓ2 = (1− δ1)
(
1
α + δ1
) 3
2 .
Again, setting its derivative to δ1 to zero, leads to a single feasible solution
δ∗1 = 1− 25( 1α + 1).
The partition point δ∗1 is valid for α ∈ [32 ,∞).
In contrast to the DMU-1 problem, the valid intervals overlap: α ∈ (0, 1.5491] for k∗ = 1 and
α ∈ [1.5,∞) for k∗ = 2. It turns out that the optimal δ1 switches from δ+1 to δ∗1 (a discontinuous
jump) as α increases. The partitions δ+1 and δ
∗
1 are both optimal for α
trans ≈ 1.5371 (the exact
expression for αtrans is too verbose). This is illustrated in Figure 7, where the maximum on the left
corresponds to δ∗1 and that on the right to δ
+
1 .
Finally, the lower bound on δopt1 is attained at the switch to δ
∗
1 (at α
trans) and the upper bound
is reached for α→∞.
Figure 7: DMU-2: pooling performance Γ2/Γ∞ at αtrans in terms of the partition δ1. The shown
points are δ∗1 (left), δ
−
1 (middle), and δ
+
1 (right).
A.5 Numerical solver
We describe the used methodology to numerically optimise the partition for the DMU-2 problem
of Section 2.6. For each α, we have to maximise ΓK or equivalently ΓK/Γ∞, so we can use the
53
Econometric Institute Report EI2017-10
formulas of the normalised objective values νΓK and νΓ∞. However, the formula for ΓK contains
index k∗, which depends on the partition. From Lemma 6 we know that k∗ ∈ {1, 2} for the optimal
partition. Therefore, we simply optimise twice: for k∗ = 1 in the formula with the restriction
δ1 >
α−1
α , and for k
∗ = 2 with the restrictions δ1 ≤ α−1α and δ1 + δ2 > α−1α . The optimal partition
is the best of the resulting partitions. Note that k∗ = 1 is always optimal for 0 < α ≤ 1, since
k∗ = 2 is infeasible for this range.
For DMU-1 and DMU-2, we have inspected the shape of ΓK as a function of the used partition
for K = 2 and K = 3. From our observations, ΓK with k
∗ fixed to 1 or 2 is a smooth function with
a clear maximum on the respective domain that can be found using a gradient-based search. Thus,
we apply a gradient-based search to maximise ΓK with k
∗ fixed to either 1 or 2. To be precise, we
use Maple’s built-in solver ‘NLPSolve’ for non-linear programs with only bounds on the variables,
which uses the Modified-Newton method, and verify the feasibility of the obtained partition. That
is, we check if 0 = δ1 < δ2 < · · · < δK−1 < δK = 1 and if the partition indeed results in the used
value for k∗.
We have also used Maple’s built-in solver ‘NLPSolve’ for constrained non-linear programs, which
uses Sequential Quadratic Programming. With this solver we can enforce the required constraints
on δk directly. Note that we still separately solve for k
∗ fixed to either 1 or 2. Both solvers give
the same results, also when specifying different starting solutions.
The used methodology only guarantees to find a local maximum. However, the numerical solver
always finds the same local optimum, i.e., it is stable. Furthermore, the results are consistent with
our available theoretical results, such as for DMU-1 with any K and for DMU-2 with K = 2.
Therefore, all results indicate that the numerical solver is able to find the global maximum.
B Addendum to Section 3
B.1 Reformulation and analysis
We follow the approach of Section 2 to reformulate the robust pooling model for cost minimisation,
given in Section 3.1. First, we make Assumption 5, so the buyer’s cost function is given by φB(x|p) =
ψ(x) + pχ(x). Under this assumption, we perform a change of variables by redefining the side
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payment as
zk = ψ(xk) + yk −Θ.
Notice that compared to Section 2 we include the outside option Θ in this change of variables.
Substitution leads to an equivalent model with simpler constraints:
min
x,y
∑
k∈K
ωk (φS(xk) + ψ(xk) + yk)−Θ,
s.t. pkχ(xk)− yk ≤ 0, ∀ pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k], k ∈ K, (B.1)
pkχ(xk)− yk ≤ pkχ(xl)− yl, ∀ pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k], k, l ∈ K, (B.2)
xk ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ K.
This formulation clearly shows that Θ has no effect on the optimal order quantities and is simply
a constant to be included in the side payment. We continue with the structure of the optimal
solution.
Lemma 14. Under Assumption 5, for any feasible x it is optimal to set
yk = p¯kχ(xk) +
K∑
i=k+1
(p¯i −
¯
pi)χ(xi) ∀ k ∈ K. (B.3)
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as that of Lemma 1. The only difference is that the optimal
y must satisfy yK = p¯Kχ(xK). In other words, we have a tight IR constraint for k = K instead of
k = 1.
First, realise that for an optimal y at least one IR constraint (B.1) must hold with equality. If
this is not the case, we can decrease all yk by subtracting some  > 0 until at least one IR constraint
is tight. This new solution is still feasible, as (B.2) only considers the difference yk − yl, which is
unaffected. Moreover, the objective value of the new solution is strictly smaller.
Suppose that yK > p¯Kχ(xK), then for k ∈ K we have for all pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k] that
pkχ(xk)− yk ≤ p¯kχ(xk)− yk
(B.2)
≤ p¯kχ(xK)− yK ≤ p¯Kχ(xK)− yK < 0.
That is, no IR constraint is tight, which is a contradiction. Hence, for an optimal y we must have
yK = p¯Kχ(xK).
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Second, fix k ∈ K with k < K and consider the IC constraints between contracts k and k + 1:
p¯k(χ(xk)− χ(xk+1)) ≤ yk − yk+1 ≤
¯
pk+1(χ(xk)− χ(xk+1)).
Since p¯k =
¯
pk+1, this implies that
yk − yk+1 = p¯k(χ(xk)− χ(xk+1)).
Using our earlier result that yK = p¯Kχ(xK), we obtain the following formula:
yk =
K−1∑
i=k
p¯i(χ(xi)− χ(xi+1)) + p¯Kχ(xK),
which can be rewritten into (B.3).
Lemma 14 shows that the side payment zk for contract k ∈ K only depends on the order
quantities of contracts with a higher index (k + 1, . . . ,K). In terms of indices, this dependency is
reversed in Lemma 1. However, in terms of efficiency the result is not reversed. Thus, both lemmas
state that the side payment depends on the order quantities corresponding to less efficient buyers.
We observe this phenomenon also in the feasible region, see Lemma 15.
Lemma 15. Under Assumption 5, any x is feasible if and only if x1 ≥ · · · ≥ xK ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Lemma 2, except that all inequalities related to the con-
straints are reversed.
First, we show the necessity of x1 ≥ · · · ≥ xK . Let k, k + 1 ∈ K and consider (B.2) for p¯k and
p¯k+1:
p¯kχ(xk)− yk ≤ p¯kχ(xk+1)− yk+1 and p¯k+1χ(xk+1)− yk+1 ≤ p¯k+1χ(xk)− yk.
Adding both IC constraints leads to (p¯k − p¯k+1)(χ(xk) − χ(xk+1)) ≤ 0. Since we have chosen
p¯k < p¯k+1, this implies that χ(xk) ≥ χ(xk+1) and thus xk ≥ xk+1.
Second, we show sufficiency of x1 ≥ · · · ≥ xK ≥ 0. Let x ≥ 0 be non-increasing and set y
according to (B.3). It remains to check feasibility of (x, y). Fix k ∈ K and pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k]. For l ∈ K
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with k < l we have
yk − yl =
l−1∑
i=k
(yi − yi+1) (B.3)=
l−1∑
i=k
p¯i(χ(xi)− χ(xi+1))
≥
l−1∑
i=k
p¯k(χ(xi)− χ(xi+1)) = p¯k(χ(xk)− χ(xl)) ≥ pk(χ(xk)− χ(xl)).
Likewise, let l ∈ K with l < k, then
yk − yl =
k∑
i=l+1
(yi − yi−1) (B.3)=
k∑
i=l+1
p¯i−1(χ(xi)− χ(xi−1))
≥
k∑
i=l+1¯
pk(χ(xi)− χ(xi−1)) =
¯
pk(χ(xk)− χ(xl)) ≥ pk(χ(xk)− χ(xl)).
Hence, all IC constraints (B.2) hold. Furthermore,
pkχ(xk)− yk ≤ p¯kχ(xk)− yk
(B.2)
≤ p¯kχ(xK)− yK ≤ p¯Kχ(xK)− yK = 0.
Thus, all IR constraints (B.1) are satisfied and the solution is feasible.
With these Lemmas we reformulate the robust pooling problem in terms of only the order
quantities x, see Theorem 16. Again, notice the slight changes compared to Theorem 3.
Theorem 16. Under Assumption 5, the robust pooling model with infinitely many constraints is
equivalent to the following problem with finitely many and linear constraints:
min
x1≥···≥xK≥0
∑
k∈K
ωk
(
φS(xk) + ψ(xk) +
(
p¯k + (p¯k −
¯
pk)
k−1∑
i=1
ωi
ωk
)
χ(xk)
)
−Θ.
Proof. By Lemma 14 we can substitute the optimal formula (B.3) for y into the optimisation model.
By Lemma 15 we conclude that the IR and IC constraints hold if and only if x1 ≥ · · · ≥ xK ≥ 0.
This leads to the equivalent optimisation problem
min
x1≥···≥xK≥0
∑
k∈K
ωk
(
φS(xk) + ψ(xk) + p¯kχ(xk) +
K∑
i=k+1
(p¯i −
¯
pi)χ(xi)
)
−Θ,
which can be rewritten into to formulation of the theorem by collecting the terms of xk.
We make additional assumptions to find a closed form solution, see Assumptions 6 and 7.
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Assumption 6. The function φS +ψ is strictly convex and differentiable on R≥0. The function χ
is given by χ(x) = x.
Assumption 7. The distribution on the private parameter p is uniform: ω(p) = 1/(p¯ −
¯
p), so
ωk = (p¯k −
¯
pk)/(p¯−
¯
p) for all k ∈ K.
These assumptions allow us to derive Theorem 17, which corresponds to Theorem 4 for utility
maximisation.
Theorem 17. Under Assumptions 5-7, the robust pooling model is equivalent to the following
convex problem:
min
x1≥···≥xK≥0
∑
k∈K
p¯k −
¯
pk
p¯−
¯
p
(
φS(xk) + ψ(xk) + (p¯k +
¯
pk −
¯
p)xk
)
−Θ.
The optimal solution is given by
xk =

∞ if k < kˆ(
d
dx(φS + ψ)
)−1
(
¯
p− p¯k −
¯
pk) if kˆ ≤ k ≤ k∗
0 if k > k∗
.
and satisfy ∞ > xkˆ > · · · > xk∗ > 0. Here, the index of the last non-zero order quantity is
k∗ = max
{
0,max
{
k ∈ K : p¯k +
¯
pk −
¯
p < − d
dx
(φS + ψ)(0)
}}
,
and the index of the first finite order quantity is
kˆ = min
{
K + 1,min
{
k ∈ K : p¯k +
¯
pk −
¯
p > − lim
x→∞
d
dx
(φS + ψ)(x)
}}
.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3, except that we use the strict convexity instead
of strict concavity of φS + ψ.
The uniform distribution implies that ωk = (p¯k −
¯
pk)/(p¯ −
¯
p). Therefore, we can simplify the
summation as follows:
(p¯k −
¯
pk)
k−1∑
i=1
ωi
ωk
=
k−1∑
i=1
(p¯i −
¯
pi) =
¯
pk −
¯
p.
Substituting these expressions in the result of Theorem 16 gives the desired formulation.
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For the structure of the optimal solution, we first relax the constraint x1 ≥ · · · ≥ xK to obtain
a separable optimisation problem. Since the objective of the relaxed problem is strictly convex and
differentiable (Assumption 6), its optimal solution can easily be determined. Consider contract
k ∈ K. We distinguish three cases.
Case I: if
d
dxk
(φS + ψ)(0) + p¯k +
¯
pk −
¯
p ≥ 0,
then it is optimal for the relaxed problem to set xk = 0. Otherwise, the optimal xk for the relaxed
problem satisfies xk > 0.
Case II: if
lim
xk→∞
(
d
dxk
(φS + ψ)(xk) + p¯k +
¯
pk −
¯
p
)
≤ 0,
then it is optimal to set xk = ∞. Otherwise, a finite x is optimal. Here, we use that the above
limit is zero only if it is an asymptote. This holds since φS +ψ is strictly convex, implying that its
derivative is strictly increasing. Furthermore, this shows that Cases I and II are indeed mutually
exclusive for (fixed) k.
Case III: if the above cases do not hold the optimal xk is found by setting the derivative to zero:
d
dxk
(
φS(xk) + ψ(xk) + (p¯k +
¯
pk −
¯
p)xk
)
= 0 ⇐⇒ d
dxk
(φS + ψ)(xk) = −(p¯k +
¯
pk −
¯
p).
Since φS + ψ is strictly convex and differentiable, its derivative is continuous and invertible. Fur-
thermore, Cases I and II are excluded, so the following value is well-defined and strictly positive:
xˆk =
(
d
dxk
(φS + ψ)
)−1
(
¯
p− p¯k −
¯
pk),
which is the optimum for the relaxed problem. Notice that the definitions of k∗ and kˆ imply that
Case III corresponds to k ∈ K such that kˆ ≤ k ≤ k∗. By strict convexity of φS + ψ we know that
its derivative is strictly increasing. Furthermore, realise that p¯k +
¯
pk −
¯
p < p¯k+1 +
¯
pk+1 −
¯
p for all
k ∈ K. Therefore, we have xˆkˆ > · · · > xˆk∗ > 0.
Combining all cases leads to a solution satisfying x1 ≥ · · · ≥ xK ≥ 0, which is feasible for the
non-relaxed problem. Hence, this is the optimal solution to our original problem.
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B.2 Proofs for Section 3.2
Proof of Lemma 12. Consider an optimal partition that does not satisfy the properties stated in
the lemma. We modify this partition into a strictly better one, which is a contradiction. The
details require two cases to be analysed.
Case I: there exists a partition point i ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1} such that δi−1 = δi < δi+1. Construct
a new partition ∆ˆ by setting δˆi = (1/2)δi+1 + (1/2)δi and δˆk = δk otherwise. By construction, we
have δˆi−1 < δˆi < δˆi+1. The normalised objective value corresponding to ∆ˆ differs from that of ∆
as follows: the terms
i+1∑
k=i
(δk − δk−1)
(
1
α + δk + δk−1
) n
n+1 = (δi+1 − δi)
(
1
α + δi+1 + δi
) n
n+1
are replaced by
(δˆi − δˆi−1)
(
1
α + δˆi + δˆi−1
) n
n+1
+ (δˆi+1 − δˆi)
(
1
α + δˆi+1 + δˆi
) n
n+1
= (1/2)(δi+1 − δi)
(
1
α + (1/2)δi+1 + (3/2)δi
) n
n+1
+ (1/2)(δi+1 − δi)
(
1
α + (3/2)δi+1 + (1/2)δi
) n
n+1
< (δi+1 − δi)
(
1
α + δi+1 + δi
) n
n+1 .
The inequality follows from strict concavity of the function (·) nn+1 on R≥0. This implies that ∆ˆ is
strictly better than ∆, which contradicts the optimality of ∆.
Case II: δK−1 = δK = 1. Define i = min{k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} : δk = δK} to be the first partition
point that coincides with δK . Notice that δ0 < δi. Construct a new partition ∆ˆ by setting
δˆi = (1/2)δi + (1/2)δi−1 and δˆk = δk otherwise. By construction, we have δˆi−1 < δˆi < δˆi+1. The
normalised objective value corresponding to ∆ˆ differs from that of ∆ as follows: the terms
i+1∑
k=i
(δk − δk−1)
(
1
α + δk + δk−1
) n
n+1 = (δi − δi−1)
(
1
α + δi + δi−1
) n
n+1
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are replaced by
(δˆi − δˆi−1)
(
1
α + δˆi + δˆi−1
) n
n+1
+ (δˆi+1 − δˆi)
(
1
α + δˆi+1 + δˆi
) n
n+1
= (1/2)(δi − δi−1)
(
1
α + (1/2)δi + (3/2)δi−1
) n
n+1
+ (1/2)(δi − δi−1)
(
1
α + (3/2)δi + (1/2)δi−1
) n
n+1
< (δi − δi−1)
(
1
α + δi + δi−1
) n
n+1 .
Hence, ∆ˆ is strictly better than ∆, which contradicts the optimality of ∆. This concludes the
proof.
Proof of Lemma 13. For K = 2 the normalised optimal objective value is given by
νΓ2 = δ1
√
1
α + δ1 + (1− δ1)
√
1
α + 1 + δ1 − Θ
∗
ν .
The derivative with respect to δ1 is
1− δ1
2
√
1
α + δ1 + 1
+
√
1
α + δ1 −
√
1
α + δ1 + 1 +
δ
2
√
1
α + δ1
and has a single root for α > 0, namely δopt1 =
1
6α(
√
α2 + 8α+ 4 + α− 2). Furthermore, for δ1 = 0
the derivative is
−
√
1
α + 1 +
√
1
α +
1
2
(
1
α + 1
)−1/2
< 0.
The inequality follows from the strict concavity of the square-root function. Likewise, for δ1 = 1
the derivative is
−
√
1
α + 2 +
√
1
α + 1 +
1
2
(
1
α + 1
)−1/2
> 0.
Hence, the root of the derivative is indeed the minimiser of the optimal objective value. The bounds
follow from the following estimates:
δopt1 <
1
6α
(
√
(2α+ 2)2 + α− 2) = 12 ,
δopt1 >
1
6α
(
√
(α+ 2)2 + α− 2) = 13 .
The bounds correspond to the limits limα→0 δ1(α) = 12 and limα→∞ δ1(α) =
1
3 .
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